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ABSTRACT
This thesis traces the development of thinking about security in the Third World 
from its Cold War past to its post-Cold War present. For this purpose, it examines 
three main approaches (traditional. Third World and critical) to the study of security 
in the Third World. It begins with a critical overview of political realism-based 
traditional (Cold War) approaches to security which treated Third World security 
problems as a mere extension of the superpower rivalry and shows how this served to 
marginalize the security concerns of Third World states and peoples. Next, it 
examines the contributions of Third World security scholars whose studies 
challenged the reductionist understanding. Western-centric character and military- 
focus of traditional approaches by theorizing security. Thirdly, the thesis examines 
the criticisms directed at Third World approaches by the students of critical security. 
Drawing upon the works of critical security scholars, the thesis argues that security 
should be conceptualized in a way that perceives the state as a means of security and 
gives primacy to the security needs of individuals and social groups. It concludes by 
imderlining the importance of recognizing specific historical, social and political 
conditions of different contexts while adopting a global perspective for the academic 
study of security in the Third World.
ÖZET
Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş döneminden günümüze Üçüncü Dünya’da güvenlik 
düşüncesinin gelişimini ele almaktadır. Bu amaçla. Üçüncü Dünya güvenliği 
konusunun çalışılmasında üç ana yaklaşımı (geleneksel. Üçüncü Dünya ve eleştirel) 
incelemektedir. Tez, siyasal realizm üzerine kurulu olan ve Üçüncü Dünya güvenlik 
sorunlanm süpergüç mücadelesinin yalmzca bir uzantısı olarak gören geleneksel 
(Soğuk Savaş) güvenlik yaklaşımlarına eleştirel bir genel bakışla başlamakta ve bu 
yaklaşımlarm Üçüncü Dünya devletlerinin ve insanlanmn güvenlik sorunlanm nasıl 
maıjinalize ettiğini göstermektedir. Ardından, geleneksel yaklaşımlarm indirgemeci 
anlayışını, Batı-merkezci yapısını ve askeri-odaklı karakterini sorgulayan Üçüncü 
Dünya güvenlik yaklaşımlanmn katkılarım incelemektedir. Tez, üçüncü olarak, 
güvenliği eleştirel bir bakış açısıyla ele alan akademisyenler tarafından Üçüncü 
Dünya güvenlik yaklaşımlanna yöneltilen eleştirileri incelemektedir. Eleştirel 
güvenlik akademisyenlerinin çalışmalanna dayanarak tez, güvenlik olgusunun, 
devleti yalmzca bir araç olarak algılayarak bireylerin ve sosyal gruplarm güvenlik 
gereksinimlerine öncelik veren bir anlayışla kavramsallaştmlması gerektiğini ileri 
sürmektedir. Tez, duruma özgü tarihsel, sosyal ve siyasal koşullara duyarlı olan, 
ancak bunun yamsıra küresel bir perspektif benimseyen yaklaşımlann Üçüncü 
Dünya’da güvenlik sorunun akademik olarak çalışılmasındaki öneminin altım 
çizerek sonuçlanmaktadır.
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INTRODUCTION
Clearly, the vast bulk o f  the Third W orld remains ve iy  
much mired in history, and w ill be a terrain o f  conflict 
for many years to com e. But let us focus for the tim e 
being on the larger and more developed states o f  the 
world w ho after all account for the greater part o f  
world politics.*
This thesis emerged out of a discontent with the stereotypical characterization of the 
Third World^ as the ‘terrain of conflict’ without searching for the structures that 
underlie these visible manifestations. Conceptions of the Third World are mostly 
shaped by images of poverty, political violence, ethnic strife, domestic social 
conflicts, civil wars and ensuing humanitarian disasters. Third World regions are 
represented as areas of chaos and turmoil, and are portrayed as trouble-spots of world 
politics. These representations, generally organized around elements of ‘deficiency,’'^  
continously refer to ‘absences’ of Third World histories and ‘failures’ of Third 
World states to replicate the Western experience.^ While Third World peoples and
' Francis Fukuyama, “The End o f History,” The National Interest 16 (1989) 15.
 ^ ‘Third World’ is an umbrella term used to depict a group o f more than 120 states that are 
geographically located in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These states share a number o f common 
features in the economic, political and social arena (such as colonial background, acute problems o f  
political and economic development, a peripheral role in world politics) which distinguish them from 
the states in Europe and North America. Among these shared characteristics, endemic and chronic 
insecurity appears as a significant defining characteristic o f  Third World states. Evidence show that 
the overwhelming majority o f  the world’s conflicts since 1945 took place within the Third World.
Yet, security problems o f the Third World are paid limited attention, or, attached importance only 
within the context o f  the risks (e.g. dangers o f  spill-over and diffusion) they pose to the security o f  the 
rest o f  the world, mostly to that o f the major powers in the international system.
 ^Alternative terms (e.g. ‘developing states/world’, ‘periphery’, ‘South’) are also used in the literature 
to refer to the same group o f states. Due to the general usage o f  the ‘Third World’ in Security Studies 
literature, this thesis prefers using this term to indicate this category o f  states. On the other hand, ‘First 
World,’ ‘Developed World’ and ‘North’ are used interchangably to refer the developed states o f  the 
West. Discussions on these terms will be examined in Chapter 111.
'* Pmar Bilgin and David Adam Morton, “Historicizing Representations o f ‘Failed States’: Beyond the 
Cold War Annexation o f the Social Sciences?” Third World Quarterly 23:1 (2002) 55-80.
 ^Steve Niva, “Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,” in Cultures 
o f Insecurity: States. Communities and the Production o f Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes at al. 
(Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1999) 147-172; Mark Berger, “The End o f  the ‘Third 
World’?” Third World Quarterly 15:2 (1994) 257-275.
their practices are relegated to marginal status, Third World insecurities are 
constantly essentialized.®
This thesis is based on the idea that there is a need for a better understanding 
of the problems confronting Third World states and peoples if we want to answer the 
question ‘how can security be achieved in the Third World?’. For this purpose, it 
examines the ways in which Third World security is studied in International 
Relations (IR) literature.’ It focuses on the issue of how the Third World, which is so 
closely associated with conflict and insecurity, is handled from the ‘security’ side of 
IR—its sub-field Security Studies. To this end, this thesis looks at three main 
approaches to the study of security in the Third World, namely traditional. Third 
World, and critical approaches. The aim is to see how they conceptualize Third 
World security. Since every theoretical approach is the product of a certain context 
and reflects certain interests and purposes, this study also explores the contexts 
within which these conceptualizations and understandings have been developed and 
looks into the underpinning interests and purposes. Drawing upon the understanding 
that recognizes the power of theory in shaping practice, it investigates the 
implications of these conceptualizations to the practice of security in the Third 
World.
Traditional approaches refer to established ways of thinking about security 
that dominated the sub-field of Security Studies during the Cold War.*  From the
® Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994) 13-38.
’ ‘International Relations’ refers to the academic study o f ‘international relations’. Chris Brown, 
Understanding International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997) 3-10.
* The label ‘Traditional Security Studies’ is used to indicate the sub-field o f  Security Studies during 
the Cold War period. However, it is important to note that there was a serious body o f non-traditional 
literature before the end o f the Cold War, as modes o f  traditional security thinking still remain today. 
Steve Smith, “The Increasing Insecurity o f  Seciunty Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last 
Twenty Years.” Contemporary Security Policy 20:3 (1990) 72-101; Bilgin and Morton, “Historizing 
Representations,” 67; Pmar Bilgin, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next 
Stage?.” Nacao e Defesa 84:2 (1998) 141.
perspective of traditional approaches to security. Third World states were usually 
viewed as ‘bit-players’ in the larger drama of world politics—^weak members which 
did not possess the capabilities needed to affect the structure of the international 
system.^ When attention was paid to the Third World, the general tendency was to 
reduce the consideration of Third World security issues to their impact on the 
strategic balance between the East and West, and define them in terms of the secxirity 
priorities of the First World.*® Security concerns of Third World states and peoples 
were left largely unexamined by scholars working within this framework.
Third World approaches to security emerged during the Cold War as a 
reaction to traditional approaches’ neglect of the Third World. Third World security 
scholars expressed the need to ‘see’ the Third World and explicitly adopted the 
perspective of Third World states. Their work highlighted the point that Third World 
states are different from those in the developed world, therefore, security issues in 
the Third World need different treatment. In other words, due to its different 
characteristics, the Third World requires a different type of theorizing. Consequently, 
these studies provided different explanations for the security problématique of Third 
World states and offered different answers to the question of how the security 
condition of the Third World could be improved." However, besides its significant
® Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979) 199-204.
For example, see Steven David, “Why the Third World Matters,” International Security 14:1 (1989) 
50-85; “Why the Third World Still Matters,” International Security 17:3 (1992/93) 127-159; Robert 
S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds.. Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World 
(Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988).
" Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder and London: 
Westview, 1985); Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon eds.. National Security in the Third World: 
The Management o f Internal and External Threats (Hampshire: Edward Elgar, 1988); Mohammed 
Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making. Regional Conflict and the International 
System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble eds.. 
The Many Faces o f National Security in the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993); Yezid Sayigh, 
“Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries,” Adelphi Papers 251 (1990); Caroline 
Thomas, In Search o f Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1987).
contributions to the study of Third World security in IR, the perspective provided by 
Third World approaches remained weak and inadequate in some other aspects.
These weaknesses and inadequacies have been pointed out by critical 
approaches to security. The academic study of international relations has been 
marked by lively theoretical debates and stimulating discussions generated by 
scholars from a variety of critical perspectives in the post-Cold War era. They 
challenged the ontological and epistemological foundations of International 
Relations, asked novel questions and addressed a range of issues that were previously 
neglected. Analysts from differing theoretical backgrounds subjected the theory and 
practice of security to serious rethinking.*^ Besides problematizing traditional 
accounts of security, they also subjected the works of Third Word security scholars 
to careful scrutiny.*  ^ Their studies offered alternative ways of approaching the 
question of Third Word security and propounded a broader intellectual terrain for 
discussing both constraints and possibilities for security in the Third World.*"*
For example, see David Baldwin, “The Coneept o f  Security,” Review o f International Studies 23:1 
(1997) 117-141; Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?” 131-157; Ken 
Booth ed.. New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991); 
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998); Keith Krause and Michael Williams eds.. Critical Security Studies: Concepts 
and Cases (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1997); Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed.. On Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Nana Poku and David T. Graham eds.. Redefining 
Security: Population Movements and National Security (Westport and London: Praeger, 1998); J. Ann 
Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) 175-197; Richard Wyn Jones, ‘“Travel Without Maps’: 
Thinking About Security After the Cold War,” in Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, ed.
Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995) 196-218.
Michael Barnett, “Radical Chic? Subaltern Realism: A Rejoinder.” International Studies Review 4:3 
(2002) 49-62; Pmar Bilgin, “Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the 
Middle East” The Review o f International Affairs 28:1 (2002) 100-118; Ken Booth, review o f  The 
Third World Security Predicament by Mohammed Ayoob in Australian Journal o f  Political Science 
30:3 (1995) 603-604; Keith Krause, “Theorizing Security, State Formation and the ‘Third World’ in 
the Post-Cold War World.” Review o f International Studies 24 (1998) 125-136.
''' For example, Pmar Bilgin, “Alternative Futures for the Middle East,” Futures 33 (2001) 423-436; 
Bilgin and Morton, “Historizing Representations,” 68-75; Ken Booth, “A Security Regime in 
Southern Afiica: Theoretical Considerations,” Centre for Southern African Studies Working Paper, 
February 1994; Ken Booth and Peter Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The 
Case o f  Southern Africa,” in Critical Security Studies: Concents and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and 
Michael Williams (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1997) 329-358; Larry Swatuk and 
Peter Vale, “Why Democracy is not Enough: Southern Africa and Human Security in the Twenty-
The structure of the thesis reflects this division in the literature; it is divided 
into three chapters. Chapter I explores how Third World was studied by traditional 
approaches. It provides a critical overview of traditional approaches to security in the 
Third World and points to their major shortcomings. It examines the epistemological 
and ontological foundations of traditional security thinking which was dominated by 
the outlook of political realism and its variant neo-realism, and analyzes its core 
concepts. The aim is to demonstrate how the dominant assumptions of the era served 
to marginalize the indigenous security needs and interests of Third World states and 
peoples from the field of study.
Chapter II focuses on Third World approaches to security and presents their 
contributions to the study of Third World security. For this purpose, it provides a 
comprehensive literature review of prominent Third World security scholars. It 
points to the conceptual limitations and emprical deficiencies of the realist paradigm 
as expressed by these scholars, and examines the alternative conceptual tools that 
were developed in these works to better reflect and study the security predicament of 
the Third World.
The purpose of Chapter III is to highlight the issues on which Third World 
approaches remained inadequate and to raise the points that the conceptual lenses 
adopted by those scholars were not equipped to see. It addresses the major 
weaknesses of Third World approaches through an examination of the criticisms 
directed at the works of Third World security scholars. It also provides alternative 
understandings of Third World security that are presented by critics.*^
First Century,” Alternatives 24 (1999) 361-389; Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn Jones, “Burundi: A 
Critical Security Perspective,” Peace and Conflict Studies 7:2 (2000) 37-56.
Critical approaches to security encompass a range o f perspectives that are critical o f  the ways 
security has been conceptualized by traditional Security Studies. While these perspectives are 
distinguished by their epistemological and ontological foundations that are radically different from 
those o f  traditional approaches, there are considerable differences within this broad approach. A
The overall aim of the thesis is to show how thinking about Third World 
security has developed in IR. It argues that the study of security in the Third World 
has come a long way since Security Studies first emerged, and is still in the process 
of evolution. The point it has reached now is promising. Works of critical scholars 
herald an emerging approach to security which privileges historical particularity 
while embracing a global perspective. This approach could pave the groimd for new 
ways of thinking about and acting for security that the Third World needs in order to 
remove the structural causes of insecurities. To examine the contemporary history of 
Third World security thinking has a crucial importance, because “it is only by 
looking at the human past, and rethinking it, that we can fully appreciate the 
potentiality for human becoming, rather than merely human being.”^^  A sound 
knowledge of the literature is considered as a good starting point for further studies 
which could produce new ideas regarding the subject. The strength of new ideas lies 
in their potential to be turned into more secure futures through opening up space for 
alternative practices that can establish the conditions for genuine security in the 
Third World.
detailed analysis o f  critical approaches is beyond the scope o f  this study. Instead, the thesis aims to 
benefit from their alternative conceptualizations o f security in general and to make use o f  their ideas 
on Third World security in particular.
Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” in Human Rights in Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas 
J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 60.
CHAPTER I: TRADITIONAL SECURITY THINKING AND 
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THIRD WORLD SECURITY
1.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyze the study of Third World security in 
traditional Security Studies. It begins by laying out the conceptual foundations of 
traditional security thinking. It provides a critical examination of the main 
assumptions, core arguments and central concepts that are introduced by realism (and 
its variant neo-realism), which was the dominant theoretical framework of the Cold 
War era. It also discusses the relationship between security theories and practices 
during the Cold War. The aim, here, is develop an understanding of the effects of this 
relationship on traditional Third World security analyses.
The second section examines the basic features of traditional approaches to 
Third World security. It tries to demonstrate the deficiencies of traditional 
approaches in grasping local security dynamics in the Third World and providing an 
accoxmt of the regional political context of Third World security problems. It also 
examines Cold War superpower practices regarding the Third World, and purports to 
show how the assumptions and findings of traditional Security Studies provided the 
background for and helped to legitimize these practices.
1.2 Traditional Security Thinking and Cold War Politics
Security Studies flourished in the Anglo-American world in the aftermath of the 
Second World War as an academic sub-field of International Relations. Security was 
studied imder the title “National Security Studies” in the United States and “Strategic
Studies” in Britain and the subject was almost exclusively concerned with 
superpower rivalry and its nuclear m anifestations.There was a symbiotic 
relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War.** Having focused on the 
security of states and military stability, the field was in many ways a direct product 
of the Cold War. In other words, “it was the perceived exigencies of Cold War 
competition that encouraged Security Studies to flourish in Western academia and 
research institutes.”*^  While “the academic field...thrived upon the Cold War 
environment;..the concepts, assumptions and findings of Cold War security studies 
helped sustain the Cold War.” *^*
Traditional security thinking has been associated with the intellectual
hegemony of (political) realism and its variant neo-realism, and dominated the field
for half a century.^* Despite the differences that have divided traditional Security
Studies into rival camps, the works of the participants in these debates share broadly
similar ontological and epistemological assumptions.^^ Epistemologically, they all
share a similar conception of what constitutes knowledge about the world with which
they are trying to engage. All the arguments have been premised on a scientific
objectivist understanding of knowledge.
This epistemology aims to describe the world “as it is”, claims to 
distiguish sharply between fact and value and between subject and 
object, and seeks objective knowledge of the world, untainted by the 
analyst’s own standpoint and predilections.^^
Four interrelated assumptions underlie positivism; The first is that there is an
objective truth that can be discovered. Secondly, the means of discovering that truth
is reason and there is only one correct form of reasoning. According to the third
Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” 133-135 
Pmar Bilgin, “Security Studies: Theory/Practice,” Cambridge Review o f International Affairs 12:2 
(1999)34.
Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 38.
Bilgin, “Secxuity Studies: Theory/Practice,” 35.
Ken Booth, “Seciuity and Emancipation,” Review o f International Studies 17 (1991) 318.
assumption, the tool of reasoning is empricism and it enables the analyst to test 
propositions. Finally, there is assumed to be a distinction between observer and
observed 24
Methodologically, the model of the natural sciences exists as a regulative 
norm to be approximated. The intent, here, is to set aside one’s own subjective bias 
and values and to confront the world on its own terms with the hope of gaining 
mastery of that world through a clear xmderstanding that transcends the limits of 
personal determinants.^^ The rationalist basis of the scientific method in disciplinary 
terms coincided with the rationalism of post-war Western society, particularly in its 
emphasis on science as the potential solution to all problems. This epistemological 
choice is based on the possibility of finding timeless and objective causal laws that 
govern human phenomena. Kenneth Waltz, the key figure of neo-realism, argues 
that “theories explain laws” and that “the urge to explain is not bom of idle curiosity 
alone, [i]t is produced also by the desire to control, or at least to know if control is 
possible.” ®^ This conception of theory advanced by Waltz borrows its epistemology 
from natural sciences, makes a radical separation between subject and object, facts 
and values.^^ Then it proceeds to identify the objective laws of international relations
Richard Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy, and Critical Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 95. 
Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy, and Critical Theory. 100.
Terry Teriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy Janies and Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies Today (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1999) 100.
Klein, Strateuic Studies and World Order. 16.
Wayne S. Cox and Claire Turenne Sjolander, “Critical Reflections on International Relations,” in 
Beyond Positiyism: Critical Reflections on International Relations, eds. ClaireTurenne Sjolander and 
Wayne Cox (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 2.
Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations o f  Critical 
Security Studies” in Critical Security Studies: Concents and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. 
Williams (Miimeapolis: Uniyersity o f  Minnesota Press, 1997) 37.
Waltz, Theory oflntemational Politics. 6.
^  Richard Deyetak, “Critical Theory,” in Theories o f  International Relations, eds. Scott Burchill and 
Andrew Linklater (London: Macmillan, 1996) 149.
by imcovering regularities in human behaviour while excluding subjective and
intersubjective phenomena such as behaviour motivated by norms and values.^ ’
Robert Cox makes a distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’
theories according to the purpose they serve. For Cox, neorealism is the typical
example of ‘problem-solving theory’ which “takes the world as it finds it, with the
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are
organised, as the given framework for action.” Its general aim is to make the
existing order “work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of
trouble.”^^  On the other hand, ‘critical theory’
stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that 
order came about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does 
not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls 
them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and 
whether they might be in the process of changing.^“*
The post-positivist turn in international theory provides a critique of traditional
thinking. In contrast to the conception of neo-realism that takes material reality as
given, critical theory^  ^ sees the social world as a construction of time and space and
views theory as always situated in a particular time and place. Since world politics is
constructed rather than discovered, there is no fundamental distinction between
subject (the analyst) and object (the focus of analysis).
For critical theorists, knowledge is always biased because it is produced fi^ om
the social perspective of the analyst. Andrew Linklater argues that all social analysts
reflect upon the cognitive interests and normative assumptions which underpin their
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal o f  International Affairs 44:1 
(1990)26.
Markus Fisher, “Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices,” 
International Organization 46:2 (1992) 429.
Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” 
Millenium:Joumal o f  International Studies 10:2 (1981) 128.
Cox, “Social Forces, State and World Orders,” 129.
^  Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders,” 129.
‘Critical theory’ refers broadly to post-positivist approaches to international relations.
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research.^® In contrast to the traditional Security Studies conception of theory as an
explanatory tool, critics suggest that theories help organize knowledge which, in
turn, enables, privileges, or legitimizes certain practices whilst inhibiting or
marginalizing others.^’ For critical theory, the world is not something external to our
theories, but our theories actually help construct the world. To put it another way,
theory is not external to the things it is trying to explain. By contrast, the very
concepts we use to think about the world and the language through which we use to
transmit our thoughts help to make the world what it is.^ * In this sense, theory is
taken to be constitutive rather than merely explanatory.^^
When theory is viewed as constitutive of reality, the distinction between
theory and practice dissolves. In other words, “theory is regarded as a form of
practice, and practice is seen as always being informed, whether consciously or not,
by th e o ry .T h is  dialectical relationship between theory and practice indicates that
theorising is an inherenty political activity." '^ According to Steve Smith,
Theories do not simply explain and predict, they tell us what 
possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not 
merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and practical 
horizons.'*^
Realism underestimates the role of the theorist in shaping the practice and the power 
of theory in constituting the reality. However, as Barry Buzan maintains, where 
realists see themselves as rationally pursuing the goal of studying ‘what is’, they are, 
in fact, an active part of the process they describe. It means that, far from being
Andrew Linklater, “The Question o f the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical- 
Theoretical Point o f  View,” Millennium 21:1 (1992) 91.
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Steve Smith, “Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Theory,” in The 
Globalization o f World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and 
Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 226-227.
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Andrew Linklater (London: Macmillan, 1996) 13-15.
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objective observers, realists in general, and the practitioners of strategic studies in 
particular, help to legitimize and reproduce the structures and relations they talk 
about."*^  Pınar Bilgin argues that “this objectivist conception of theory and the 
theory/practice relationship resulted in an essentially normative theory of security 
studies masquerading as an ‘objective’ approach to human phenomena” and glossed 
over the constitutive relationship between strategic theorizing and Cold War political 
and security practices.'^
Traditional security thinking is also status-quo oriented. Cox argues that 
problem-solving theory, despite its claims to value-neutrality, is “value-bound by 
virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own 
framework.”^^  Therefore, where traditional security scholars see themselves as 
describing the world ‘as it is’, in fact, they make a choice in favor of reifying the 
prevailing status-quo.'^^
Ontologically, those who have adopted the traditional security thinking share 
a similar view of the world they are trying to account for. According to this view 
which is dominated by the outlook of realism, the meaning of security is subsumed 
imder the rubric of power—simply the combined capability of a state'^ ^— a^nd is 
synonomous with the security of the state against external dangers, which is to be 
achieved by increasing military capabilities."^* While ‘power’ is focused on as a key 
variable in accoimting for political behaviour and is central in the development of 
international relations, states are considered as the key actors in the realist world
Steve Smith, “Positivism and Beyond,” in International Theory: Positivism and Bevond. eds. Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 13.
Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom o f Realism?” in International Theory: Positivism and Bevond. 
eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
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because they are assumed to represent the greatest concentrations of power, 
especially in having the greatest capacity to use military force.'^^
In searching for the sources of continuities and regularities, particidarly at the 
international level, classical realists such as Morgenthau tend to emphasize the 
permanence of human nature as reflected in the political construction of states.*® On 
the other hand, to explain the uniform behaviour of different nation-states and the 
constancy of international political life across centuries, neorealists focus on the 
system level and find the continuties in the anarchic structure of the international 
system. In neo-realist theory, international structure emerges from the interaction of 
states and then prevents them from taking certain actions while propelling them 
toward others. Waltz distinguishes the structure of the international system from 
the structure of domestic political systems according to three criteria: the ordering 
principle of the system, the character of the units and the distribution of capabilities 
across the units. In contrast to the domestic political systems where the ordering 
principle is hierarchy, the international system is decentralized and anarchic, which 
implies that there is no overriding authority or government to discipline the 
interaction of independent sovereign states.** Thus, a sharp boundary is drawn 
between domestic order and international anarchy. This construction of the 
inside/outside separation by realism practically defines the discipline of International 
Relations.*^ Change is expected in the form of development and progress inside the 
state where time is a meaningful measure, whereas the anarchic structure of the
Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” 176.
Teriff et al.. Security Studies Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 30,39.
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985) 4.
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outside is assumed to “reproduce itself endlessly so that there is no progress, and 
time does not signify change.”^^
The assumption that relations between states are necessarily driven by a logic 
of anarchical competition justifies a second assumption that security can be provided 
only within states.^ ® The state, accordingly becomes the primary locus of security, 
authority and obligation.^’ This leads to the state-centric conceptualization of 
security where the state is both the primary referent (who is to be secured) and the 
agent (the provider of security).^* Nevertheless, this state-centric approach helps 
reinforce ‘statism’ which is defined as “the concentration of all loyalty and decision­
making power at the level of the sovereign state.”^^  Different from state-centricism, 
statism involves a normative claim that in political terms, states should be accorded a 
high value in themselves.^® The state is taken for granted as a unified, relatively 
homogenous and peacefiil community. The security of the state is regarded as 
synonymous with the security of its inhabitants and a normative justification for 
focusing on the state as the referent object of security discourse emerges depending 
on the claim that states are the agents which provide citizens with security at the 
domestic level.®’ While the security of the citizens is identified with and guaranteed 
by that of the state, those who stand outside it represent potential or actual threats.
For neorealism, states are the units whose interactions form the structure of 
the international system. Even though they vary in size, wealth, power and form and
Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom o f Realism?,” 53.
R. B. J. Walker, One World. Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder: Lynne 
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differ vastly in their capabilities, they are characterized in neorealism by sameness, 
or by being ‘like’ units.^  ^All states in the international system are made functionally 
similar by the constraints of structure.^'' In the anarchic realm, all states are required 
to pursue security for their survival before they can perform any other function.®  ^
Following this top-down approach, the analyst who adopts a traditionalist outlook 
does not need to know much about the domestic politics within a state in order to 
understand that state’s international political behaviour. One does not need to worry 
about what goes on inside the units of the system because the xuiits are bound to 
conform to the demands of the system.®  ^The need to ‘open the box’ is neglected and 
the state, particularly its internal dynamics and the pattern of state-society relations, 
is black-boxed.^’ As one author summarizes the realist argument, “a state (any state) 
will behave in certain statelike ways no matter what its internal composition because 
of constraining influence of international anarchy.” *^ Since there is no higher 
authority to resort to when resolving conflicts, the international system is 
characterized by self-help in which states ultimately can only rely on their own 
efforts to keep safe.^ ®
The self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs lead to rising 
insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the 
measures of others as potentially threatening. This is called ‘the security dilemma’. 
The effort to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the
“  Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 95-97. 
“  Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 93.
“  Scott Burchill, “Realism and Neo-realism,” in Theories o f  International Relations. Scott Burchill 
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power of the others renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for 
the worst. It results in the vicious circle of search for security and power 
accumulation. Simon Dalby summarizes the traditional notions of a security dilemma 
as follows:
The traditional notions of a security dilemma refer to the observation 
that military preparations in one state, made in the name of providing 
for protection of a population, often have the unintended consequence 
of aJarming policy makers in other states. Increased power in one state 
makes other state policy makers react by taking military and political 
actions to protect their state against the possibilities of military threat 
from the first state. Thus, unilateral action stimulates unintended
consequences that aggravate rather than improve the situation 71
According to Buzan, the security dilemma provides an essential link between realism 
and strategic studies.’  ^ Realism emphasizes the competitive and conflictual side of 
international relations, because relations between states are assumed to be insecurity- 
driven, and because the anarchic structure is supposed to provide few constraints on 
states pursuing power to the best of their ability. This is directly reflected in the 
security dilemma. Based on a zero-sum notion of security (in the sense that states are 
viewed as competing with one another for security and more security for one actor 
means less for another^^), security is seen as essentially deriving from military 
strength States’ mistrust of each other is expected to result in an action-reaction 
cycle that may lead to destabilizing arms races and a decrease in the overall security 
of the system. The mechanism known as the ‘balance of power’ is emphasized as the 
primary means of minimizing conflict and war by realists’ ,^ and seen as crucial for
™ John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2:2 (1950) 157.
”  Simon Dalby, “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporaray Security 
Discourse,” in Critical Security Studies: Concents and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael C. 
Williams (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1997) 12.
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Strategy and International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991) 16. 
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n(ythe operation of the international system. The workings of this mechanism, 
whereby states act so as to prevent any one state dominating’ ,^ permit at least some 
degree of stability and peace. Hence, stability is attributed to the balance of power.’*
Bradley Klein argues that the classical realist concern for power politics in 
securing the state is transformed into what he calls ‘strategic violence’. This 
transformation is necessary to secure one’s own survival against the threats posed by 
all other states and is embedded into a structure of global relations—^namely the 
security dilemma—^preparing the ground for the concept of anarchy to become the 
definitive characteristic of International Relations.’  ^ At this point, security policy 
acquires a very special character. It becomes the site at which “democracy, openness, 
and legitimate authority must dissolve into claims about realpolitik, raison d’etat, and 
the necessity of violence.”*®
The legitimacy of state power is claimed to derive from the state’s capacity to 
bring order to the conflict that results fi'om the insecurities of competitive self- 
interested behaviour. Security is, then, associated with a particular form of politics 
and defined as ‘national security’. National security is based on the premise that 
security is a matter of the defense of the citizens of a sovereign territory.** Based on 
this statist outlook, the idea and practice of national security is concerned with the 
safety of particular political communities that are sovereign states, and postulates
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. 97; John 
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Dilemmas o f World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, eds. John Baylis and 
N.J.Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) 9-10.
Steve Smith and John Baylis, “Introduction,” in The Globalization o f World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2 0 0 l)4 .
Michael Nicholson, International Relations: A Concise Introduction (New York: New York 
University Press, 1998) 93.
’’ Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order. 19-20.
R.B.J. Walker, “Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge o f  World Politics,” Alternatives 15 (1990) 
11- 12.
Walker, One World. Many Worlds. 118-125.
17
states as moral communities worth preserving in their own r ig h t . I t  arises from the 
supposed demands of the security dilemma in the states system and becomes the 
boundary between inside and outside, order and chaos, and community and anarchy. 
Moreover, defined as national security, security becomes the preserve of state elites. 
Security is often identified with the interests of states elites and governments rather 
than with society as a whole.*  ^Hence, equating security exclusively with the security 
of the state and the use of the language of national security cloaks the interests of 
sectional groups.*"^
The assumptions about the nature of the international system and the security­
seeking behaviour of states fit the grim mood and temper of international politics in 
the Cold War era. Realist thinking was absorbed by strategic thinkers*^ and the 
ideology of the Cold War corresponded with that of realism*^. Drawing on the 
neorealist assumption that the crucial factor in the international system is the 
distribution of power among units, which is defined by the number of poles or great 
powers,*’ international security was equated with the strategic relationship between 
the great powers. The escalation of the arms race between the US and the Soviet 
Union was characterized as a classic case of the security dilemma and tight bipolarity 
was considered to have produced a balance which was assumed to assure a 
considerable measure of security.** The meaning of security was further cemented 
into a statist and military framework.
William Bain, “The Tyranny o f Benevolence: National Security, Human Security, and the Practice 
o f Statecraft,” Global Society 15:3 (2001) 277-278.
Walker, One World. Many Worlds. 119, 124.
Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity,” 335.
John Garnett, “Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions,” in Contemporary Strategy 2'“’ ed., Vol.1, 
eds. John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) 11.
** Robert Cox argues that neorealism, which he calls ‘the new American realism’, is the ideological 
form abstracted fi'om the real historical framework imposed by the Cold War. Cox, “Social Forces, 
States and World Orders,” 131.
Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 97-99.
** Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability o f  a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93 (1964) 881-909.
18
Adopting a realist worldview and heavily dominated by US strategie 
thinking about nuclear weapons and the security problems of the US 
and its NATO allies, the field of national security was based on the 
assumption that, since nuclear wars were too dangerous to fight, 
security was synonymous with nuclear deterrence and nuclear power­
balancing 89
While security was equated with order and maintenance of international boundaries, 
strategic studies was systematically biased both towards narrowly military 
conceptions of security and the perceptions and policies of the status quo powers 
The field was entirely taken up with questions of military balance and the relations 
between conventional and nuclear weaponry.The literature was concerned with 
military aspects of nation-state goals, alliance-building processes, independence and 
sovereignty of states, conflict spots in the world arena and problems of system 
maintenance. Essential issues such as the physical and psychological quality of life, 
social equality and justice, democratization, development and human rights were 
either excluded fi'om the agenda or attached less importance and were referred to as 
‘low politics’. The state apparatus was provided superiority over society and instead 
of examining deep structural conditions, the focus was kept on overt evidence of 
power or insecurity
As the field identified itself more with power, with the modem state and with 
the management of great power relations, it converted to a narrower, more 
technocratic enterprise where highly technical modes of study based on abstract 
formulations—such as game theory and systems analysis— h^ave come to 
predominate.^^ Although the field “armored against critical reflection,” '^* strategic
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thinking was not without its critics even during the Cold War period.^^ Hedley Bull 
criticized the strategists for leaving morality out of account, taking for granted the 
existence of military force and confining themselves to considering how to exploit it. 
For Bull, the assumptions of the strategists were inclined to oversimplify and distort 
political reality, and not to allow for change. In the name of being objective, the 
strategists were acting as “collaborators in the system and were speeding its 
movement toward catastrophe.”
Strategic ideas and policies were designed to deal with a bipolar world of the
two superpowers within a hostile relationship.^’ However, as Ken Booth maintains,
this was a confrontation between nations or states that ceased to be simply a matter
of a political clash of interests but instead took on the character of a political culture
which he calls ‘the Cold War of the mind’.^ * For Mary Kaldor, the East-West
conflict in the post-war political order was an ‘imaginary war’ through which the two
social systems—^namely Atlanticism and Stalinism—^were consolidated and
reproduced.^^ Borrowing from Foucault’s terminology, Kaldor presents this
im aginary  war as “a discourse which expresses and legitimizes power relationships
in modem society.”*®® As Hugh Gusterson points out;
The dominant discourse in security studies embodied a ‘Cold War 
narrative’ in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but 
constantly shifting, clash between two global empires, and from the 
repeated introduction of new technological possibilities and threats into 
the story line.*®*
”  Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 38.
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The very usage of notions of order, stability, deterrence and balance of power served 
to reproduce and reify the structure of the international system which the powerfiil 
found congenial. In Booth’s words, “Strategic theory helped to constitute the 
strategic world, and then strategic studies helped to explain it—self-reverentially and 
tautologically.”'®^ Since realism has set the terminological agenda within 
International Relations, alternative and dissenting discourses have been effectively
occluded and marginalized 103
1.3 Traditional Approaches to Third World Security
During the Cold War, the majority of the work produced by analysts in Security 
Studies concerned issues of deterrence and security pertaining to the superpowers 
and their allies, namely NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Third World secxirity issues 
acquired relevance only insofar as they could be slotted into the overall pattern of 
major power geopolitical global conflict.'®'' Traditional Security Studies 
distinguished the ‘central strategic balance’ from ‘regional conflict and regional 
security’. The former focused on superpower nuclear deterrence and their European 
allies while the latter involved conflict and conflict management issues arising 
primarily in the Third World. Problems of regional instability in the Third World 
were given attention to the extent that they had the potential to affect the superpower 
relationship.'®^ In doing this, the general tendency was to address the fundamental
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security problems of Third World states withio an intellectual framework that was 
shaped by dominant paradigms of International Relations based mostly on the realist 
conception of security. The conceptual framework that was applied to developed 
states was transposed to the Third World. In other words, security problems of the 
Third World were either “reduced...to an analysis of their impact on the strategic 
balance between East and West'“®, or tended to be “explained with theoretical 
models that derived from the international relations of the West.”'°^ The worst case
1 nfiwas, as Michael Barnett states, that the Third World was ignored altogether.
While the Third World was incorporated into Security Studies from the point 
of view of major powers and advanced states, the underlying purpose of traditional 
approaches was to preserve the status quo.*°  ^In Buzan’s words, “being essentially a 
theory of Great Power politics, neorealism did not have much time for the weaker 
players in the system.”" “ According to Waltz, the structure of international politics is 
defined in terms of major powers.’"  Stability means the capacity of a system to
119maintain itself and systemic instability can only result from major power wars. 
The weaker members of the system, such as the Third World coxintries, do not
1 1 q
possess the capabilities needed to affect the system structure.
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As Buzan maintains, it was this logic that excluded the Third World from 
neorealist theory.**'* Accordingly, the traditional literature concerned itself with 
questions of superpower objectives in the Third World and the compatibility of 
American and Soviet security interests in various Third World regions. Instruments 
and obstacles in managing and regulating the superpower competition, zones of 
influence, possible sources of superpower confrontation, development of codes of 
conduct in regional conflicts and superpower crisis prevention systems became the 
main foci of these studies.**  ^ The main concern was that the superpowers might be 
drawn into regional conflicts in support of local clients through inadvertent 
escalation or policy miscalculation and this confrontation might have led to a nuclear
war 116
During the Cold War, the vast majority of the world’s conflicts occurred in 
the Third World. According to Amitav Acharya, the ‘permissibility’ of Third World 
conflicts was an important feature of the Cold War order. He maintains that the fear 
of the escalation potential of any East-West confrontation prevented even the most 
minor form of warfare between the two blocs in Europe.**  ^On the other hand, local 
conflicts were not only permitted, but even encomaged*** in the Third World where 
the danger of nuclear escalation was perceived as more remote. It was assumed that 
with stability at the center (Europe) came new pressures on the periphery (the Third
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World). According to Mohammed Ayoob, stability of the central balance rendered 
Third World conflicts necessary, because these conflicts were viewed “as a way of 
letting off steam which helps to cool the temperature aroimd the core issues which 
are directly relevant and considered vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the 
international system.” Thus, in contrast to the neo-realist understanding that the 
Cold War and bipolarity ensured a stable international order , as Acharya puts it, 
“the superpower rivalry, while keeping the Tong peace’ in Europe, served to
199exacerbate the problems of regional conflict and instability in the Third World.”
In practice, both superpowers perceived the Third World as an arena “where 
ideologies would clash without the immediate and obvious dangers attendant upon 
any attempt to change the status quo in Europe.” The Third World has provided a 
relatively permissive and attractive environment for superpower competition which 
seemed to hold out far greater possibilities for making gains at the expense of the 
adversary. Thus, the Cold War manifested itself as the exportation of great power 
conflicts to the Third World, “whether as wars by proxy or as exacerbation of 
indigenous Third World conflicts...in order to cool down the political temperature 
around the core areas of the globe.”^^ '^  Diplomacy, economic assistance, ideology, 
arms transfers, and various forms of direct and indirect intervention were the 
principal superpower instruments deployed in this struggle. Superpower diplomacy
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tended to sustain the status quo since both superpowers sought influence with 
established states and since ruling regimes had an interest in the territorial status quo.
The transfer of arms to Third World states through sales, credits and aid was a 
foreign policy tool of the superpowers which was used to gain allies from the 
adversary superpower and its clients. Furthermore, as Mary Kaldor argues, the 
two blocs sought to substantiate the ‘imaginary war’ and uphold perceptions of 
military power through violent forays into the Third World.
Acharya maintains that “opporhmism and influence-seeking by the 
superpowers...led to the internationalization of civil wars and contributed to the 
prolongation of regional wars” in the Third World. Seeking to extend their control
and influence in the Third World, superpowers militarily intervened in many of the 
armed conflicts in the Third World. According to Waltz, the bipolar structure 
encouraged both Moscow and Washington to impose an East-West framework on 
local and regional rivalries. As he pointed out: “In a bipolar world there are no 
peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that 
happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them.”*^  ^ The security of a 
particular Third World state or region was not seen as an end in itself and therefore a 
contribution towards global security, but rather as a means to enhance the security 
interests of the superpower itself. Since the superpowers were guided more by 
their own rivalry than by concern for local outcomes, and since their access to local
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influence often depended on their taking sides in local conflicts, the outcome of their 
intervention in the Third World ended up perpetuating local rivalries. Third World 
states were viewed as pawns in the ‘great game’ being played by the major powers 
rather than as actor in their own right. In Ayoob’s words, they “possessed only 
instrumental value for the superpowers in the sense that they can be used to enhance 
the latter’s global objectives, including those regional objectives that are related to
1 'X'ythe global strategies of the superpowers.”
The debate over the significance of the Third World— f^or International 
Relations in general and Security Studies in particular—^was carried on almost 
exclusively in the United States and from the perspective of United States policy 
interests.^^  ^In academic discussions regarding the issue of whether Third World was 
worth studying, the main criteria was the importance (centrality) of the Third World 
for U.S. interests.' '^^ In other words, disciplinary generalists and area studies 
specialists were encouraged to analyze the Third World “within the global security 
considerations and practices of the USA.” The prioritising of US security concerns 
when conceptualising regional security was coupled with the neglect of the regional 
political context of security problems. Joseph Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones argue 
that the development of security studies in the United States more than in other 
countries caused many analyses to suffer from ethnocentric biases. For them, the 
predominance of American perspectives on security issues was due to the central role 
the U.S. played in international politics since the Second World War. Accordingly,
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they argue, many of the major concepts and theories have been developed by U.S. 
scholars/^^
The nomothetic universalism of social sciences (the claim to be producing
universal social knowledge) is reflected in traditional approaches to Third World
security and has allowed “theories and models developed in and devised for the ‘First
World’ to be applied confidently in the ‘Third World’. T h e  conviction that
Western experience alone is emprically sufficient to establish general laws of
individual, group or state behaviour irrespective of time and geographic location is
the cause for the Eurocentric and normative character of the literature despite its
claim of universal relevance.*^* As Klein argues.
When the security problems of the Third World were addressed by the 
Strategic Studies community, the dominant intellectxial fi-amework has 
been a regionalized version of the global strategy/security paradigm, so 
that the dilemmas facing ‘small’ or ‘less powerful’ states are 
analogized to that of the states system of the major powers. In other 
words. Third World conflicts have been explained in terms that pit 
each of the actors against one another, so that the relevant model is of 
clearly articulated states that stand over their own civil societies and 
seek to fend off nascent security dilemmas that manifest themselves in 
the external, anarchic world of potentially hostile neighbours.
The greater emphasis put on the state as a centralized governing organization (and
less on the individuals and social groups existing within that state) contributed to the
widening of the gap between the state organization and society and citizens in Third
W o r l d . T h e  external-oriented conception of security (which focused on war, the
ability to fight wars and the external threats to the state that might give rise to wars)
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adopted by traditional approaches was “used to justify keeping internal order at any 
cost,”*'^  ^ This led to policies of repression and patterns of expenditure that served 
narrow sectional interests in the Third World. The language of ‘national security’ 
became the cloak for the interest of the regime'"^  ^ in power and “lend[ed] it an air of 
legitimacy internationally.”*'^  ^ Consequently, the survival of a particular regime 
became the essence of Third World security and proved usefiil both to the 
superpowers and Third World governments.
To summarize, traditional approaches did not try to define Third World 
security issues distinct from the superpower rivalry. Regional events were viewed 
through the superpower template with a military focus. Either the superpowers, or 
the state elites—^under the name of ‘national security’—^were recognized as the 
referents for security. An important point, though neglected, is that “most of the 
salient regional security issues in the Third World had a life of their own independent 
of superpower rivalry.”*'*'* The tendency of the states of the North to define security 
issues of the Third World in terms of their own security priorities led to an 
imderestimation of local security dynamics and neglect of the local patterns of 
regional security.*'*  ^An external-oriented conception of security which priviliged the 
security of states and military stability was adopted while regional sources of 
insecurity and regional peoples’ multiple and contending conceptions of security 
were not given attention.*'*  ^ Conceiving security in the Third World in solely
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military-stability oriented terms from a top-down approach contributed to a glossing 
over of economic, political and societal security concerns that are struchirally-based 
and afflict the region.’"^’
1.4 Conclusion
Traditional approaches to security viewed the Third World through the prism of 
East-West relations. It was the position of the Western states or the superpowers 
which were given prominence and priority in security debates and analyses while the 
concerns and priorities of Third World states were regarded as secondary or 
derivative. Questions of military balance and matters related to weaponry were 
placed ‘high’ on the agenda, whereas vital issues that formed the main security 
concerns of Third World regions and peoples almost fell outside the paradigm’s 
focus.
When Third World states were taken into consideration, “they were supposed 
to fit into the established paradigm, and assigned the role of junior partners in the 
power game.”*"^® Attempts to extend the dominant conceptual framework to the Third 
World failed to grasp the inherent complexities and pluralism of Third World issues. 
Neither the regional sources of Third World conflicts and nor their socio-historical 
background were explored. External-oriented understanding of security “turned 
analysts’ attention away from domestic security concerns.”*^® Security concerns of 
social groups and individuals in the Third World states did not appear in these 
analyses. The statist conception of security helped to legitimize government’s
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domination over society'^* and served to justify the oppressive behavior of some 
Third World regimes. In practice, Third World security became increasingly 
associated with the survival of particular regimes, especially those that acted in line 
with the security interests of the superpowers.
Having provided a critical overview of traditional approaches to security in 
the Third World, the next chapter will turn to look at Third World approaches to 
security. The latter emerged as one of the main strands of thought that challenged the 
mainstream thinking. Third World security scholars drew attention to the deficiencies 
of traditional approaches in imderstanding and dealing with the Third World security 
problems. They expressed the need to ‘see’ the Third World and to theorize for the 
Third World context. They sought to understand and address the ‘unique’ security 
needs and requirements of Third World states through incorporating into their 
analyses historical and regional characteristics of the Third World as well as 
domestic variables peculiar to Third World states.
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CHAPTER II: THIRD WORLD SECURITY SCHOOL
2.1 Introduction
Third World emerged as a challenge to mainstream Cold War security consensus 
both in practice and t h e o r y . I n  theory, this challenge has been clearly articulated 
by Third World approaches to security. Students of Third World security criticized 
traditional approaches basically on three grounds. First, automatic categorization of 
Third World problems into an East-West framework was rejected. In Caroline 
Higgins’s words, “to study the ‘Third World’ was to protest against a reductionist 
paradigm in which developments everywhere were seen in the light of Cold War 
preoccupations.”*^  ^ As stated in Chapter I, the task behind the “consideration of all 
security problems to an analysis of their impact on the strategic balance between East 
and Wesf’*^"* was one of managing the situation by taking the existing system for 
granted and making it function more smoothly. However, many of Third World 
states considered a possible change in the status quo not as a threat to, but as an 
integral part of, their security. They assumed a dissident role in the global system 
of states*^  ^ where they had no way of improving the terms vmder which they 
participated.*^’ The present global system was seen as ensuring relative stability, 
security, freedom, access to resources and quality of life for the states of the North at 
the expense of the Third World where the states remained ossified at the base of the
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global structure and permanently condemned to the periphery. The collective aim 
of the Third World was to establish a new international order with new rules and 
institutions that would express their aspirations.
In practice, the rejection of the bipolar outlook of the superpowers and their 
allies was manifested in the formation of the Non-Aligned movement by Third 
World states. The majority of Third World states viewed the superpower 
competition and the Cold War alliance systems with profound mistrust and as a 
major threat to international security in general and their own security in 
par t i cu lar .The  overarching geopolitical structure of the East-West divide was 
perceived as further exacerbating Third World insecurity by limiting the possibility 
of autonomous decision-making and action for Third World states that were already 
suffering from an acute lack of control over the international environment in which 
they had to function.*^' Joining the non-aligned movement, Third World states 
attempted to maintain a distance and independence from the two superpower blocs in 
the formulation of their own foreign policies and sought to represent their own 
security agendas that stood outside the global contest conducted by the 
superpowers. Despite de facto alignment of some non-aligned states with one of 
the superpowers, membership in the NAM provided many Third World states with 
some room to maneuver in their relationship with the superpowers, and the
1
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ideology underlying the movement eonstituted a direet challenge to the mainstream 
security thinking.*^
According to the second criticism, traditional approaches to security did not 
have much relevance to the Third World. Students of Third World security argued 
that there existed an apparent fissure between emprical reality in the Third World and 
established paradigms of mainstream International Relations Theory in general and 
Security Studies in particular. As will be discussed later in this chapter, these 
scholars noted that many of the most central concepts—such as anarchy, security 
dilemma, national security—did not fit easily into the Third World context and did 
not prove adequate for understanding the majority of threats, conflicts and violence 
plaguing the Third World. This was due to the fact that theory had derived from the 
experiences of Western states whose conceptions and experiences differed from 
those of Third World states. In contrast to the Western realist conception of the state, 
the Third World state is characterized by weak and divisive social, economic and 
political structures. Again, contrary to the predominant conception of security as the 
physical protection of nation states from external military threats, these structures are 
insecure domestically because threats usually emanate from inside. It was argued that 
this emprical reality required the incorporation of domestic variables—such as socio­
political cohesiveness, political legitimacy, incomplete state-making and nation­
building processes, and perceptions of state elites— i^nto security analyses in the 
Third World context where internal-external distinctions made little sense and the 
problems of internal and external insecurity rendered one another more acute. These
164 Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?,” 139.
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scholars also discussed the practical implications and possible outcomes of
transposing certain concepts onto Third World states without emprical foimdation.’^ ^
The third criticism was directed towards the military focus of traditional
Security Studies. Traditionally, the military ability to deter external threats to a
nation’s territory (and previously acquired values) was seen as the essense of
security.'^® However, the accumulation and maintenance of military force is not
enough by itself to solve the security problems of Third World states since threats
facing the Third World are diverse and complex.*®  ^ Deterrence against external
attack ceases to be an adequate representation of security objectives when it is
internal insecurity that is the greatest threat.*^* In the words of Caroline Thomas,
Security in the context of the Third World states does not simply refer 
to the military dimension, as is often assumed in the Western 
discussions of the concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a 
state’s existence which are already taken care of in the more-developed 
states, especially those of the West.*®®
A broader notion of security is required to understand the security predicament of the 
Third World where nonmilitary threats such as resource scarcity, overpopulation, 
underdevelopment, environmental degradation are at the heart of insecurity.*^® The 
prevalence and interconnectedness of internal fragility and external vulnerability of 
the state converts problems such as ethnic conflicts, erosion of state legitimacy, food
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shortages, decline of water resources and debt into formidable threats to the state’s 
survival and its basic values. This explains why students of Third World Security 
have called for the inclusion of economic, social, political and environmental issues 
in the security agenda. Issues related to economic security have been especially 
stressed since deteriorating economic conditions affect internal political stability of 
the Third World state and result in foreign impositions on state sovereignty and 
action, which in turn exacerbate internal divisions and increased the internal and 
external vulnerability of the Third World state. Special emphasis was made on the 
role of the structure of the international economic system in engendering insecurity 
in the Third World.*’^
In practice, as Third World states increasingly perceived themselves as 
vulnerable to the workings of the international economy which was beyond their 
control and to decisions and policies they did not own, their dissent turned into 
action. They called for a structural reform of the global economic system through 
participating in the “Group of 77” forum where they expressed their economic 
grievances and demands, which included the creation of orderly and stable 
commodity markets, increased access to Northern markets, increased aid flows on 
improved terms, greater accountability of transnational corporations and more 
effective participation in the international decision-making process.'’  ^ Since the 
liberal international economic order is an extention of a political order and is subject
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to political challenge, the campaign of the Third World states was a political action 
for reform where the legitimacy of the prevailing order was called into question.
Having provided the basic features of Third World security thinking and 
practice, this chapter aims to examine the works of prominent Third World security 
scholars in detail and elaborate on the major arguments that are developed in their 
work. It is organized aroxind five overriding themes central to these studies, each of 
which corresponds to a separate section. Accordingly, the first section is about the 
question of system-level analysis within the Third World context. It focuses on 
studies that contest the main assumptions of neorealism—especially on the ‘unitary’ 
nature of the international system—^within the Third World context and define the 
Third World as a separate security realm. It examines the ‘Two-Worlds’ approach 
which assumes that substantial differences between states in the Third World and 
states in the West require the application of different theoretical models.
The second section focuses on the domestic political dimension of insecurity 
in the Third World. It presents an overview of debates over the nature of the Third 
World state and its implications for both security thinking and security practices in 
the Third World. Students of Third World security have also explored the linkages 
between domestic insecurities and external vulnerabilities of Third World states. 
Accordingly, the third section looks into this relationship and examines its effects on 
regional security dynamics in the Third World.
The fourth section focuses on studies that examine the specific experience of 
Third World state-making and imderline its relation to the security predicament of 
the Third World. The fifth section examines attempts of Third World security 
scholars to develop a more inclusive understanding of security that covers those
Marc A. Williams, “The Developing Countries and the International Economic Order: A View  
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issues (such as starvation, malnutrition, economic deprivation, and social injustice) 
which are not considered to fall within the purview of traditional Security Studies, 
but constitute the main sources of insecmity in the Third World. It also presents an 
overview of discussions on the relationship between security and development in the 
Third World context.
2.2 Neorealism and the Third World; Hierarchy vs. Anarchy, Unit vs. System
There is a consensus among scholars of Third World security that neorealism does 
not apply to Third World states and does not help in understanding the security 
problems of the Third World. The two main assumptions of neorealism (that the 
political world inside the state is characterized by hierarchy while the political 
universe between states are characterized by anarchy, and that there is no functional 
differentiation among units in the anarchic international system even though there are 
huge variations in their capacity to perform the tasks they are faced with) are 
especially questionable -within the Third World context. Barry Buzan*^  ^ summarizes 
these arguments as follows:
One is that many Third World states are too weakly developed to 
qualify for hierarchy, and that de facto much of their domestic politics 
has anarchic qualities. The other is that there are significant elements 
of hierarchy in relations between states, and that these elements are 
particularly strong in relations between the more developed core and
less developed periphery, 177
According to the first argument, the neorealist distinction between anarchy among 
states and hierarchy within them is not valid for the Third World context because of 
the non-Westphalian character of Third World states. They are assumed to be
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clustering around an image of a distorted, incomplete or weak copy of the original 
Westphalian model. It is argued that they do not conform to a homogenous view of 
the units in the system and do not maintain the sharp inside/outside distinction the
1  "JO
model presumes.
The point of functional differentiation in the international system due to the 
existence of major differences between states in the Third World and those in the 
West links with the argument that the structure of the international system is 
characterized more by hierarchy rather than anarchy.*’  ^ Waltz does not deny the 
possibility of finding evidence of functional differentiation and hierarchy within the 
international system and the possibility of identifying elements of anarchy within 
many domestic political systems.^*® However, he sees anarchy as the prevailing 
structure and concludes that “hierarchic elements within international structures limit 
and restrain the exercise of sovereignty but only in ways strongly conditioned by the
101
anarchy of the larger system.”
Carlos Escudé develops a model of “peripheral realism” through which he
tries to correct the conceptual error of neorealism in attributing an anarchic structure
to the interstate security order. He argues that for issues related to peace and security,
hierarchy describes the structure of the international system better than anarchy and
this is more evident in the periphery than in the core. He contends that
contrary to the neorealist model the interstate system is not 
characterized by ‘anarchy’, but by an incipient and imperfect 
‘hierarchy’ in which we find states that command, states that obey, and 
states, without the power to command, that refuse to obey. The foreign
Barry Buzan, “Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing About the Third World,” in 
International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman (London: Macmillan, 
1998)215.
Buzan, “System versus Units,” 216-217.
Aswini K. Ray makes a similar argxnnent where he presents a picture o f  a structurally hierarchical 
international political system. Ray, “The International Political System and the Developing World: A 
View from the South,” 13-28.
Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 114.
Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics. 115-116.
policy options of those that ‘obey’ are, therefore, constrained by that 
hierarchy in ways that do not apply to Great Powers/*^
He asserts that Waltz is wrong in assuming that there is no functional differentiation
of states since the differences in capabilities are so great that they are translated into
functional differentiation. In this sense, he finds the dichotomic categorization of
states into “Great Powers” and “weaker states” as a useful analytical tool which helps
in acknowledging the functional differences between them. He favors the insights
of classical realism over contemporary realism in assessing world politics and
demonstrates this by quoting the famous theoretical remark of Thucydides, that “the
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
In Escudé’s model, there exists three types of states which are fionctionally
differentiated according to whether they rule, obey or rebel. Although a strucure of
anarchy prevails among them. Great Powers tend to preside over the weaker states on
issues related to international peace and security and impose order on their
relationships. Weaker states are divided into two groups: those which obey the rule
of the Great Powers and avoid high-cost foreign and defense policies in favor of the
welfare of its citizens, and those which rebel against this rule and play a high-risk
game in international politics in which the level of tolerable costs to their citizenry is
very high. The majority of the interstate commxinity, including the Third World and
advanced but militarily weak industrialized states, form the group of “states that
obey”. Finally, a small number of Third World states challenge the domination of the
Great Powers by refusing to obey. The main point is that there is anarchy among the
Great Powers, but between the Great Powers and the rest of the world, there is
hierarchy. It is this hierarchy that constrains the external behaviour of most Third
Escudé, “An Introduction to Peripheral Realism and Its Implications for the Interstate System: 
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World states, and in order to develop their own political and economic systems, the 
majority accept the hierarchical character of the international system led by Great 
Powers.
As Escudé and Buzan maintain, the division of the world into Great Powers 
and weaker states as such, is based on the functional differentiation of units in the 
system and the existence of different types of states due to different types of political, 
economic, and cultural development. It is assumed that there are significant 
differences among the units in the international system, in other words, between the 
states in the Third World and the states in the West; not just of population size, 
power, ideology and geography, but in the way in which tiiey are constituted as 
states. This assumption gives rise to partial application of concepts and theoretical 
fi'ameworks geographically and historically and stimulates thoughts about 
significantly different subsystems of International Relations. According to Buzan’s 
argument, the “two worlds” perspective assumes that the international system, rather 
being a single politico-strategic space with a single set of rules of the game, is 
divided into two worlds and implies that different kinds of rules apply to different 
parts of the world.**"^  Two versions of this perspective will be discussed here.
First, Buzan develops a two worlds view^ ®^  based on a division of the 
contemporary universe of states into three types, namely postmodern, modem, and 
premodem. The modem state corresponds to the standard Westphalian model which 
is defined by strong government control over society and restrictive attitudes towards
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openness. The modem state is the prevailing type of state in many parts of the Third
World. The leading states and all of the great capitalist powers, on the other hand,
have evolved beyond the modem model and have taken on a postmodern form in the
pursuit of wealth, democracy, and individual rights. They are characterized by an
open and tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic, and political interaction, an
influential civil society, pluralism and multiculturalism, prosperity, and economies
linked to transnational global economy. Still maintaining borders, sovereignty, and
national identity, the postmodern states do not ascribe importance to these products
of modernity. They keep their security agendas narrow. At the opposite end of the
spectrum stand premodem states, dispersed throughout the Third World and most
notably in Africa and Central Asia, with low levels of sociopolitical cohesion and
poorly developed stmctures of government. Although they are headed towards
modernity, there are serious tensions between the elements of modernity and
traditional political and societal patterns in these states. In extreme cases such as
‘failed’ states, anarchy much more than hierarchy prevails inside.
One world (call it the zone of peace) is defined by a postmodern 
security community of powerful industrial democracies, and 
international relations within this world no longer operate according to 
old realist mles. In the zone of peace, states do not expect or prepare 
for war against each other, and since this zone contains most of the 
Great Powers this is a very significant development for the whole of 
the international system. Reflecting the character of postmodern states, 
economies and societies are highly open and interdependent, 
transnational players are numerous and strong, and international·*· ■' I Of:
relations is heavily institutionalized.
He defines the other world, the zone of conflict, as a mixture of modem and 
premodem states:
In relations among (and vdthin) these states classical realist rales still 
obtain, and war is a usable and used instrument of policy. In this zone, 
international relations operate by the traditional rales of power politics 
that prevailed all over the world up to 1945. States expect and prepare
186 Bu2an, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 223.
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for the possibility of serious tension with their neighbours. Some 
restraint is provided by deterrence (in a few places nuclear deterrence) 
but economic interdependence between neighbours is generally low, 
populations can often be easily mobilized for war...and use of force 
among some of them cannot be ruled out. 187
A similar approach of two worlds is developed by James M. Goldgeier and Michael 
McFaul, with reference to the post-Cold War context.*** The main argument of the 
authors is that in the post-Cold War international environment there exists two 
worlds: the core and the periphery. They differentiate the goals and behaviours of the 
states in the core from those of the states in the periphery. The core is made up of the 
industrialized states of Western Europe, North America, and Japan in economic 
terms and Great Powers dominating the international system politically. They 
constitute a “great power society” gathered around liberal economic and democratic 
political norms and institutions. It is argued that broad economic interdependence 
within the core and the existence of well-functioning democracies promote the 
abolishment of the use of military means to settle disputes between Great Powers. 
Although conflicts still occur, they are settled through negotiation and compromise 
rather than through the use or threat of force. Economic interdependence, political 
democracy, and nuclear weapons lessen the security dilemma and balance of power 
politics is no longer the defining feature of interactions among states in the core. This
• 1ROresults in a relationship consistent with a liberal model of international politics.
However, liberal rules defer to those of realist politics in the periphery where 
realism seems more relevant for understanding regional security systems. The 
authors use the term “periphery” for the agriculturally based, industrializing states of 
the developing world which are relatively “weak” when compared with Great Powers 
of the core. States in the periphery do not share a common political and economic
Buzan, “System versus Units in Theorizing,” 224.
James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale o f  Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post- 
Cold War Era,” IntematioiwJ.ttgMu^ion 46:2 (1992) 467-491.
system, and the norms and institutions associated with them. Due to the fact that 
many regional security systems comprises a diversity of states with radically 
different governments, economies, cultures, ethnic groups and religions, 
predictability based on a set of shared norms does not exist in the periphery. “A 
variety of political systems ranging from democracies to monarchies exists side by 
side, and interdependence between peripheral states is subordinate to dependence on 
core states.”'^° Since sovereignty is newly acquired and often challenged both from 
within and without, and military threats from neighbours and internal threats from 
insurgents continue to endanger national security in the periphery, military force is 
still seen as a valuable means for influencing outcomes and increasing state power by 
the leaders. As a consequence of all these factors, the security dilemma is alive and 
paramount in the periphery.^^^
According to Barry Buzan, the two worlds approach carries the risk of 
oversimplifying the emprical picture since there are states in the core which behave 
like peripheral states (such as Albania, Northern Ireland and ex-Yugoslavia) and vice 
versa (such as the ASEAN states). An alternative look enables us to see that the two 
worlds—core/periphery, or zone of peace/zone of conflict, First WorldAThird 
World—do not exist as distinct and separate territorial spaces operating in isolation 
from each other, but are “interleaved modes of living”.*^  ^For Buzan, the key point 
regarding the two-worlds formulation is the issue of “how the zone of peace and the 
zone of conflict relate to each other.”*^^
To summarize, even though a complete separation of the two worlds is highly 
impractical, the spatial organization of zones and the claim for distinct modes of
Goldgeier and McFaul, “A Tale o f Two Worlds,” 468-470,478-481. 
Goldgeier and McFaul, “A Tale o f  Two Worlds,” 469.
Goldgeier and McFaul, “A Tale o f  Two Worlds,” 477- 480.
Buzan, “ ‘Change and Insecurity’ Reconsidered,” 10.
theorizing for these zones can be interpreted as “an attack on the attempts of system
theorists, especially neorealists, to impose a single, global theory on the study of
International Relations.”*^  ^ It turns our attention from systemic analysis to the
analysis of specific state/society relations and to domestic factors which have direct
implications for security and related foreign policy preferences. In Buzan’s words,
“contrary to neorealism, the two worlds view rests on the assumption that the overall
character of International Relations is generated more by the internal character of the
units comprising the system than by the system structure.”'®^ He argues that
There are fundamental qualitative differences in the way in which the 
states and societies of Europe, North America, and Japan relate both to 
one another and to their populations on the one hand, and the way in 
which states in the Middle East, South Asia, and many other places do 
so. These differences are rooted deeply in the form and character, and 
therefore also the history, of the states and societies within the two
zones 196
Similarly, Ayoob expresses the need for historicizing the state and delving deeper 
into the historical record of Third World to comprehend the security predicament 
suffered by the majority of states which is much more complex and driven by 
domestic factors than the security dilemma that neorealism posits. He cnticizes 
neorealism for its ahistorical stance, focus on the present and its preoccupation with 
the systemic level of analysis and Great Power relations, while he appreciates 
classical realism for its primary concern with the formation and ordering of political
10ftcommunities and only secondary interest in the analysis of international structures. 
He calls for theorizing on the basis of adequate knowledge of historical and 
geographic contexts in order to explain the behaviour of the units constituting the
Buzan, “System versus Units in Theoriiang,” 225.
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international sys tem.There  is a consensus among students of Third World security 
that questions of security in the Third World (both internal and external) require an 
understanding of the nature of the Third World state and domestic variables which 
fall largely outside the domain of neorealism. The next section elaborates these 
issues and focuses on the domestic political dimension of insecurity in the Third 
World.
2.3 Weak State, the Inseeurity Dilemma and Regime Security
The notion of national security derives from the Western realist conception of the 
state^°” which is identified with Western, democratic, constitutional political 
institutions, an effective government, inviolate geographical boundaries, and a 
monopoly over the use of force within those boundaries.^®* The optimal situation for 
the statehood, and for local and international security, is where boundaries of state 
and nation (defined as a collective of people who identify themselves on the basis of 
common ethnicity, language, race and historical experience ) coincide. 
According to Brian Job, national security, in the traditional sense, implies the 
relations between a population viewed as a nation and its government, state 
institutions and officeholders that are perceived to be legitimate. Second, the capacity 
of the state to protect against external threats arising in an anarchic international
system is indicated.204
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The Western notion of national security is inextricably linked with the 
Western image of a liberal polity and the idea of the operation of a competitive 
Western style democracy?®^ Borrowing from the work of Berki, Robert Jackson 
argues that the concept of security is presumed to begin in personal security and 
culminate in a general or political security of one’s homeland, which is the “state” in 
the contemporary world. The state has become the mechanism by which people seek 
to achieve adequate levels of security against societal threats. It becomes both the 
referent and the agent of security in the sense that we expect to find relative security 
within our country and expect it to be provided by our government. It is assumed that 
states and governments exist for the benefit of their population and not the reverse.
However, we find a different picture in many parts of the Third World where 
the state is frequently in opposition to the society and is a major source of insecurity 
for the lives of the people.^®’ It is because the concept of statehood described above 
does not fit easily into the Third World context. Third World states are artificial 
constructs with arbitrarily drawn boundaries by the colonial powers within which 
borders of nation and state do not coincide and the sense of a common national 
identity does not exist. The process of decolonization can be said to have created 
states in the Western image, but it failed to create nations that fit them. According to 
Barry Buzan, “the political legacy of most Third World governments was a state 
without a nation, or even worse, a state with many nations. It is this legacy that
Thomas, “Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts,” 180.
Robert H. Jackson, “The Security Dilemma in Africa,” in Insecurity Dilemma: National Security o f  
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defines the problem of weak states in the Third World.” ®^* This politieal entity has 
been often defined as uncertain and msecure?°^
The roots of Third World insecurity are found in these weak state structures 
that emerged fi’om the process of decolonization, where the state’s territorial 
dimensions do not coincide with its ethnic and societal composition?^® There failed 
to emerge a sense of identification of certain communities and regions with the new 
state especially in cases where individuals belonged to a nation which remained 
partly across an inter-state border. The problem of division of political power 
between groups of varying ethnic and secterian origins often manifested itself as the 
establishment of minority rule, which resulted in a further alienation fi’om the state. 
New concepts of state, central government and citizenship contradicted with existing 
(traditional) social and political structures and mechanisms, generating dual loyalties 
and creating ineffective civil societies.^** The inability to develop the capacity to 
ensure the habitual identification of their inhabitants with the post-colonial structures 
is the primary reason for the suffering of many states in the Third World from crises 
of self-definition and problems of political and historical legitimacy
While there exists a variety of communal groups contending for their own 
securities within the borders of the state, the regime in power lacks the support of a 
significant proportion of the population because it represents the interests of a 
particular ethnic or social segment or an economic or military elite that has gained 
control. Even though the state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide order 
and the conditions for satisfactory physical existence and fails to achieve any 
national consensus, it does not become vulnerable to the primary threat of anarchy in
Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 26.
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the international system due to the fact that it has an existence guaranteed by the 
norms of sovereignty and non-intervention in a supposedly anarchic international 
environment?^^
Sub-Saharan African states exemplify this point quite clearly. Robert Jackson 
calls them as “quasi-states” which possess juridical statehood derived jfrom a right of 
self-determination, but do not possess emprical statehood in the sense that they lack 
the capacity for effective and civil govemment.^ '^* Many of these entities in reality 
are little more than juridical shells and have already disintegrated emprically. These 
states enjoy external protection and their sovereignty is generally respected by other 
states within and outside of Africa. However, the state does not have the capacity to 
ensure internal security for its population. International society underwrites the 
existence of the states regardless of whether these states convert this into domestic 
security for their citizens or not.^ ^^
Sovereign-citizen relations break down and give rise to something like 
a domestic state of nature. However, the sovereign does not fall 
because international society strictly refuses to recognize any claimant 
sovereign other than that of the existing jurisdiction—even if that 
claimant might in fact be more effective or more domestically 
legitimate or both. 216
As a result of the granting of international legitimacy to states which lack domestic 
legitimacy, the Third World state is preoccupied with internal rather than external 
security since it is protected by the norms of the international community from the 
threats originating from outside. Thus, the logic of the security dilemma metaphor is 
turned on its head with regard to the weak Third World state. Instead of the security 
dilemma which assumes inside the state to be safe and threats to emanate from
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outside, an alternative framework of “insecurity dilemma” is offered by Brian Job, 
which provides a more appropriate analytical tool to develop an understanding of the 
security problems of the Third World, where “the sense of threat that prevails is of 
internal threats to and from the regime in power, rather than externally motivated
917threats to the existence of the nation-state vinit.”
The case of African states show that a political space is established for 
domestically insecure Third World states to emerge and survive. International 
support for the existing African jurisdictions, argues Jackson, perpetxiates domestic 
and personal insecurity hy preventing the formation of alternative jurisdictions that 
might be less arbitrary, more cohesive and more legitimate. It also preserves 
underdevelopment since there is a strong connection between domestic insecurity 
and economic deterioration.^'* Ayoob raises the same point by stating that 
international norms have made the security problems of the Third World states more 
acute by preventing the political demise of even the most unviable entities. In his 
words.
Since states, once established, have an open-ended guarantee on the 
part of the international system that their legal existence is assured, the 
traumas they suffer in the process of translating juridical statehood into 
emprical statehood take on the garb of challenges to their security
rather than threats to their existence 219
The analytical tool of insecurity dilemma thus enables us to see how the security 
problems of the Third World states are created by other states, starting with colonial
99Пpowers, and sustained by the norms of international society.
Buzan questions the appropriateness of the concept of national security 
(which he defines as ‘4he security of a whole socio-political entitiy which concerns
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the way of life of a self-governing people, including their social, cultural, political, 
and economic modes of organization, and their right to develop themselves under 
their rule”^^ *) for the Third World context by differentiating the nature of states in 
the West from those in the Third World according to their socio-political 
cohesiveness. Accordingly, the states in the West are mostly characterized as strong 
states, where there is a widely accepted idea of the state and a single source of 
authority that has a broad legitimacy within the population. Indigenous domestic 
issues play a minor role in national security concerns since state and society are 
closely linked together. Thus, they provide a relatively clear referent for national 
security. “For strong states, the concept of national security is primarily about 
protecting its independence, political identity and way of life from threats posed by 
other states, rather than from threats arising within its own fabric.”^^ ^
On the other hand, Buzan labels most of the Third World states as weak 
states due to the low degree of socio-political consensus in them. He argues that in 
‘relatively strong’ weak states (such as India, Brazil, Argentina), it can be observed 
that there are both a strong identification with the idea and institutions of the state 
and a clash of strong local political identities with the central government at the same 
time. In ‘ordinary’ weak states (such as Pakistan, Syria, Turkey and Zaire) political 
cohesion seems to rest more on power than on a socio-political consensus on the 
nature of the state where “political loyalties are more strongly directed towards tribal, 
ethnic, political or religious groups than they are to the state.”^^  ^ In very weak states 
(such as Lebanon, Afghanistan, Angola, Uganda) there is neither a widely accepted
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and coherent idea of the state among their populations, nor an effective governing
power to impose unity. Buzan’s words are reminiscent of the insecurity dilemma.
The fact that they exist as states at all is largely a result of other states 
recognizing them as such and/or not disputing their existence. When 
viewed from the outside they look like states because they have 
embassies, a flag, boundaries on maps, and a seat in the United 
Nations. But viewed from within, they are anarchic, with different 
armed self-governing groups controlling their own territories and 
contesting central government by force.^ '^*
The important point here is that the referent object for security becomes difficult to 
define in weak states and the primarily external orientation of the concept of national 
security is replaced by an increasingly domestic agenda of threats.
This point directs attention to the internal threats and the perceptions of the 
governments in weak states which view domestic threats as targeting their own 
authority. Ayoob makes important points with regard to differing notions on the part 
of ruling regimes concerning the definitions of threats and consequent responses. 
Due to the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and the absence of open 
political contests, many Third World states are ruled by regimes with narrow 
political bases which command the state machinery mostly by coercive force. Since 
it is these regimes which define threats to the security of their respective states, it is 
no surprise that they will define it in terms of regime security rather than the security 
of the society as a whole. Self-preservation at the center of their concerns, the values 
that are aimed to be protected by these regimes differ vastly from the core values of 
the large segments of the population over whom they rule.^^^
Buzan expresses serious concerns about whether domestic threats should be 
considered as a part of the national security problem. He has doubts as to whether 
these threats are directed to the state or the nation, or to the interest of the ruling
Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 19. 
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group. The following “danger in using national security for politically weak states is 
that it easily legitimates the use of force in domestic politics.”^^ ’ Caroline Thomas 
also stresses this point by arguing that the concept of national security caimot be 
applied to the Third World as it is utilized in the developed world because it “lends 
an air of legitimacy to policies of repression and patterns of expenditures that serve 
an extremely narrow sectional interest in these states” and “is dangerous to the very 
people whose security is being considered.”^^ * She argues that the concept of 
national security is divorced from the notion of a liberal democracy when it is 
applied to the Third World. It means nothing more than policies carried out by 
governments in the name of a non-existent nation in order to legitimize those 
policies—^whatever they are— i^n the eyes of Western states.^^^
Thomas suggests that ‘state security’ seems to be a more appropriate tool of 
analysis for many Third World states than national security. She argues that it is 
more entrenched in the emprical reality of social and political formations in the Third 
World where the nation-state model does not a p p l y B u z a n  also states that state 
security is one of the tools to analyze Third World politics, but does not favour the 
usage of this concept because he identifies it with totalitarian regimes. He also 
maintains that since the concept of state security puts more emphasis on the state as a 
centralizing governing institution and less on the individuals and social groups 
existing within the state, it is an easier (and less ambigous) concept to apply to Third 
World where the distance between the state organization and society (and citizens) is
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broader than it is in the Western polity?^' However, once again there appears the 
danger of the blurring of distinctions between the security of the state and the 
security of the regime. As Yezid Sayigh argues, the ruling cliques, hy a management 
of policy and resources in a manner ultimately designed to protect themselves, albeit 
imder the guise of achieving state security, may obscure the distinctions between 
their own regime security and that of the state as a whole. It perpetuates the ‘crisis of 
the state’, which he defines as the continous challenges faced by Third World in 
consolidating state structures that are both viable and stable.^^^
Amitav Acharya aims to strip the pejorative connation usually attached to the 
meaning of regime security by defining it basically as “a question of the ability of the 
government of the day, the ruling group or elite, to successfiilly manage and 
overcome the problems of governance while maintaining the continuity of its 
authority and hold on to p o w e r . H e  points to the possibility that regime 
insecurities may (or may not) be reflected in the tendency of the regime to use 
political power for its narrow ends or preserve itself through the use of violence. 
However he also notes that such practices are common in the Third World and the 
distinction between state security and regime security is difficult to make in the case 
of Third World countries. He argues that a careful look at the so-called “national” 
security policies of many authoritarian Third World states would show that “regimes 
try and frequently succeed in presenting their own legitimacy problems as national
'y ' iA
and state security problems.”
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Azar and Moon share this point of view and consider the trade-off between 
regime security and national security as a manifestation of the legitimacy crisis, 
which they explain as follows:
Faltering legitimacy and the erosion of political authority increase 
internal threat to regimes in power in the form of political protests, 
sabotages, revolts and rebellions. As regimes in power try to respond to 
and control these threats in the name of national security, they employ 
several methods. The troubled political leadership may invent a new 
national security ideology and attempt to indoctrinate and contain those
who oppose the regime 
They argue that the methods employed by ruling regimes in this trade-off often result
in an eventual weakening of regime security that is supposed to be fostered and
undermines national security per se.
Brian Job points to three intertwined strategies that are adopted by Third 
World regimes to maintain their regime security in response to domestic threats: 
militarization, repression, and diversionary tactics. Militanzation corresponds to 
developing and arming substantial military and police forces through structuring 
military doctrines and creating certain societal institutions and practices in the form
'y in
of civil-military relations, patterns of military recruitment and education. The issue 
of militarization poses the question of guns versus butter in the Third World context, 
referring both to the direct costs of security needs in armaments and standing armies, 
and to the opportunity costs that indicate the costs of security responsible for 
depriving the society of alternative security systems. Keeping in mind the emprical 
fact that the military is the effective wielder of power in the regime in a large number 
of Third World states, the capacity to coerce, kill, and destroy becomes an important
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source of power and the pre-eminent safeguard for “national security”. Thus, 
repression becomes another important strategy a substantial portion of Third World 
regimes— b^oth military and civilian—^undertake consciously and systematically 
against significant portions of their populations.^ "*®
The third strategy, to focus upon external enemies, is a card often played by 
insecure rulers. They tend to ensure regime security by inciting national security 
concerns. By trying to create a common national concern and strengthen national 
unity, the aim is to mobilize support around the state/regime and its efforts against 
this threat at the risk of cultivating external fnctions and conflicts.^ "** Regular 
attempts of the ruling regimes to stimulate perceptions of external enemies aim at 
justifing their internal security policies in general and the buildup of military forces 
in particular. The Falklands crisis is an example in which the Argentinian military 
junta responded to domestic crisis threatening its survival by precipitating a new 
national security crisis that involved the use of the Argentinian forces to regain the 
Falkland Islands from the British. While the Falklands has been a persistent security 
issue for Argentina, the timing of the invasion was motivated by the survival of the 
regime that faced a serious legitimacy crisis at home. The invasion resulted in the 
collapse of the Argentinian regime, and a further destruction of national security
According to Ayoob, it is often the case that “internal threats are 
‘externalized’ by regimes which are the targets of such threats.” "^*"* By portraying 
these threats as emanating from outside and violating the norm of sovereignty, they 
represent them as illegitimate and their repressive actions as legitimate. He argues
Azar and Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security,” 4. 
Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 28-29.
Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 32.
Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma,” 29.
Azar and Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity,” 83. 
Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 8.
55
that through the help of securitization process— b^y turning a political, economic or 
social problem into a military one, in other words— a^nd by presenting the military 
threat as coming from external sources. Third World regimes try to confront 
domestic dissidents by military means which they favor?'*^
Within this framework, Carlos Egan investigates the complex relation 
between national security and regime security in the Argentina case. He argues that 
the two Dirty Wars (in the 1920s and 1970s), which occurred at key conjunctures in 
the development of capitalism, were waged in the name of national security and 
carried out to protect the interests and privileges of the dominant class which 
dependent capitalism had created and reproduced. These regimes institutionalized 
state terrorism in the name of economic development and justified gross violations of 
fundamental human rights in the name of national security. They invoked the 
national security threat to laimch their Dirty Wars as a fig leaf for an armed attack by 
the dominant elites against a sector of population whom they considered as 
threatening the system of capitalism. The growing social unrest was characterized as 
a “foreign threat” to national security. '^*  ^This case is illustrative of how the concept 
of national security is employed to enable and legitimize certain policies in the Third 
World.
Drawing upon the writings of Third World security scholars, this section 
examined the nature of the Third World state and the internal security predicament of 
the Third World, which limit the applicability of most common concepts of IR and 
Security Studies to the Third World setting. It tried to demonstrate the misfit between 
Western conceptual categories and observed evidence in the Third World, and
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discussed the practical implications of their usage. It showed how the concept of 
(Westphalian) state, the idea of national security and the security dilemma metaphor 
have been called into question by these scholars.
Students of Third World security have also examined the relationship 
between internal and external dimensions of security in the Third World. 
Accordingly, the next section focuses on this relationship and directs attention to the 
potential of the internal security problems of Third World states to generate inter­
state conflicts and cause regional insecurity in the Third World. It also discusses the 
role of regime security concerns in the formation of regional security arrangements.
2.4 The Relationship Between Internal and External Dimensions of Security in 
the Third World and Regional (In)Security
Given the fact that the state in the Third World does not fit into the Westphalian 
model, security becomes a complex phenomenon and achieving the condition of 
security becomes a different task in Third World. Strong linkages between domestic 
and external aspects of security deserves more attention in this regard. '^^’ Caroline 
Thomas defines insecurity in the Third World framework as “the relative weakness, 
the lack of autonomy, the vulnerability and the lack of room for manoeuvre which 
Third World states have on economic, political and military levels.” She 
establishes a relationship between the two dimensions of insecurity where the 
problem of internal insecurity renders the problem of external insecurity more acute 
and vice versa. She emphasizes the search for security on the part of the Third World 
state as the major determinant of its external and internal behaviour. However, she 
underlines that the task of Third World states is qualitatively different fi’om those of
Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s; Security in the Developing World,” 3; Job, “The Insecxnity 
Dilemma,” 30.
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other states, because states in the Third World are domestically insecure and have
weak political, economic and social structures that are often penetrable. Besides,
Third World states suffer from an acute lack of control over the international
environment in which they must function, and this directly affects their ability to
control domestic economic, social and political domain. '^^^
According to Yezid Sayigh, the weak and unstable state structure forms the
“connecting thread between the problems faced by developing countries in achieving
social, economic and political progress and those posed by the problems of managing
their external environment.”^^® He describes the linkage between internal and
external levels of security in the Third World as follows:
For countries suffering from economic and infrastructural 
underdevelopment, unstable political systems which are for the most 
part post-colonial, and ethnic and other social cleavages, a wide variety 
of problems pose security threats because they undermine the 
autonomy and the survival of the state from within. Indeed, these 
various internal dilemmas form the main security challenge to most 
developing countries, or at least are the main cause of vulnerability to 
external or military threats.^^*
He argues that the internal vulnerability of these countries makes them more 
vulnerable to various forms of external pressure, manipulation and intervention. He 
notes that the penetrability of their economies, socieities and political processes as 
well as their physical vulnerability have invited external military involvement, either 
in the form of superpower rivalry or in pursuance of private commercial or strategic 
aims in the past.^^^
The connection between internal and external dimensions of security in the 
Third World is also vmderlined by Mohammed Ayoob. According to Ayoob, 
emphasizing the fact that threats usually emanate from within the boundaries of the
Thomas, In Search o f Security. 4.
Thomas, In Search o f Security. 4.
Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,” 6.
Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,” 3.
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Third World states does not mean that external threats are totally absent, for they are 
not. However, internal threats weigh heavier in the mix of internal and external 
threats to the state structures and their regimes in the Third World. Moreover, threats 
emanating from outside often augment the problems of insecurity that exist within 
state boundaries, which would be quite ineffective if the Third World state was 
domestically secure.^^^
Ayoob also highlights the potential of the internal dimension of Third World 
states’ security problems to generate interstate conflict. It directs our attention to how 
intra-state conflicts turn into inter-state conflicts and cause regional insecurity in the 
Third World. Ayoob argues that when external threats exist, they acquire prominence 
basically because of the insecurities and conflicts that are rife within Third World 
states.^ "^* In other words, the external dimension is secondary in character and comes 
into play largely because of the existence of sources of conflict that inhere within 
these states. Colonially crafted boundaries often divide populations that are tied to 
each other on the basis of precolonial affinities and loyalties such as kinship, tribe 
and religion. Therefore, “domestic conflicts in postcolonial states can easily spill 
across political boundaries into contigous states whose populations may provide aid 
and succor to protagonists in such conflicts, thus involving neighboring populations 
and eventually neighboring states into these conflicts.”^^  ^These domestic insecurities 
emanating from colonial legacies and weak state structures lead to frequent interstate 
conflicts in post-colonial regions that radically undermine the regional order. 
However, although Ayoob acknowledges the primacy of the role of domestic factors, 
he also underlines the symbiotic relationship between internal and external aspects.
Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,”12.
Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic o f  the Third World,” World Politics 43:2 (1991) 
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He argues that in many of the regional conflicts that have originated as intrastate in 
character, it can be observed that one set of factors could not have thrived without
'ycfi
the presence of the other.
In the previous section, regime security was defined as a key component of 
the national security perceptions and agenda of individual states in the Third World. 
It was also highlighted that regime survival dictates the official definition of what 
constitutes a threat to national security in these states. In contrast to the orthodox 
logic of national security that defines those acts by neighbours or extraregional 
powers as a threat to national security only if they raise the prospect of military 
attack, there have been many cases in the Third World where governments have 
portrayed an external act as a threat to national security even though it did not carry 
such a danger. Revolutionary upheavals in a neighbouring state—^mostly in cases 
where revolutionary events create alternative models of political order and carry the 
potential to aggravate domestic vulnerabilities already extant within the 
neighbourhouring societies—often dominate the national security agenda of the 
regimes in the region and are perceived as threats to regime survival. This results in 
policy responses that involve the full range of national security apparatuses of the 
state, including military force.^^  ^The Iraqi regime perceived Iran as constituting an 
ideological and political threat after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 on the grovmds 
that it was encouraging Iraq’s Shi’a majority to revolt and topple the Sunni- 
dominated state elite.^^* According to Ayoob, this fear led Saddam Hussein to launch 
his invasion of Iran, which was designed to pre-empt an anticipated movement 
against the Iraqi regime fi-om within. He argues that threat perception of the Iraqi
Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 42.
Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament 50-51.
Acharya, “Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World,” 145-146.
Korany, Brynen and Noble, “The Analysis o f National Security in the Arab Context,” 14-15.
60
regime would not have reached the level of launching an invasion of Iran and that the 
Iran-Iraqi dispute would not have certainly gone beyond border-demarcation and 
resulted in an inter-state conflict if the government in Baghdad had been more 
representative of the majority of its population?^^ In this regard, the 1980-1988 Iran- 
Iraq war clearly illustrates the role of domestic dynamics and concerns for regime 
survival in creating regional conflicts.
Regional security in the Third World has generally been conceptualized as the 
‘regional relations of weak states’. The sources of regional conflict in the Third 
World have been attributed to the problem of domestic instability— i^ncluding regime 
vulnerability. As Buzan delineates:
A local security environment composed of weak states contains within 
itself many sources of instability. A state vdthin such an environment 
cannot count on the political continuity of its neighbours, and therefore 
cannot easily build up a durable and stable set of local political 
relations...In good part, because Third World states themselves are 
unstable, conflicts between them are rife, alliances are temporary and 
unreliable, and security communities like ASEAN are rare.^^
Unlike Buzan’s pessimistic outlook regarding the prospects for ‘weak state
regionalism’, Amitav Acharya presents a rather different picture that portrays regime
security concerns (arising from common domestic vulnerabilities and legitimacy
problems) as a motive force of regionalism in the Third World. Through a
comparative analysis of the security orientations of two regional organizations,
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and GCC (the Gulf
Cooperation Council), Acharya arrives at the conclusion that weak states with
internally vulnerable regimes enter into security arrangements with like-minded
Mohammed Ayoob, “Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?” International 
Affairs 60:1 (1983)43.
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regimes in the region to counter common threats to regime security and to ensure 
their self-preservation?^*
In both cases, members of the regional associations considered internal 
challenges, including threats to regime survival fueled by discontent 
over ideological, political, and economic issues, with far more 
seriousness than the possibility of external threats. The ruling regimes 
perceived the security implications of major geopolitical events in 
wider region in terms of the latter’s possible or actual impact on their 
own domestic vulnerabilities. In both cases, these supposedly external 
events did not constitute a likely threat of military invasion. But they 
were regarded as security threats because of their potential to aggravate 
the existing domestic challenges to ruling regimes, in part by 
presenting models of political systems that were radically at variance 
with, and potentially more mass-based, than their own.^ ®^
Since regime security concerns dictate the overall security policy framework of the
state, he argues that a convergence of regime secmity interests overrides the
animosities and conflict that would normally arise within a local security
environment composed of weak states. The common vulnerabilities of these states
provide the basis for regional/subregional security arrangements that are regarded as
useful for coping with their domestic challenges and countering common threats to
regime survival as well as dealing with the regional security environment.
Unlike Acharya, Ayoob argues that even though regional security 
cooperation based on common regime security concerns assure the security of these 
regimes, it does not add much to regional security. It may even contribute to regional 
polarization since the creation of common (internal and regional) enemies is an 
indicator of the conflict creation potential of regime solidarity in the regional context. 
He also maintains that the dynamics of regional security in the Third World are 
influenced by both the variables functioning at the domestic level and the operation 
of global balance of power including rivalries among the major powers. Regional 
state elites attempt to utilize issues relating to the global balance to enhance their
Acharya, “Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World,” 148-149. 
Acharya, “Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World,” 161.
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own state and regime security interests. According to Ayoob, this leads to the
intertwining of the domestic, regional and global dimensions of security
[N]arrowly-based and insecure Third World regimes, particularly those 
under increasing challenge domestically and regionally, use the idea of 
regional security to form cooperative arrangements with similar 
regimes in their regions to defend themselves as well as to justify their 
strategic and political links with external powers whose interests 
converge with the interests of these regimes.^^
For Ayoob, one can only talk about “genuine” regional security in tiie Third World
when these states become less fragile than they are today. It requires the
strengthening of state structures and regimes through the grant of unconditional
legitimacy by their populations. He argues that this is the only means that can
provide Third World regions the autonomy from major powers and the capacity to
influence the international system, and thxis establish strong linkages between the
security of Third World states and the global security as a whole.^^^
As examined, the majority of the Third World security scholars point to the
internal fragility of Third World states—due to the specificity of the historical
pattern of their state-formation—as the main source of insecurity in the Third World.
As a result of this understanding, consolidating their nation-states and developing
viable political systems are perceived as the best way for Third World states to
reduce their vulnerability and to achieve security both internally and externally. State
making and nation-building enterprises are, in this sense, regarded as valid attempts
to consolidate the authority and to secure the existence of the state in order to act as a
viable political unit in the international scene. The next section focuses on the
specific experience of state-making and nation-building in the Third World which is
Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the 
Construction o f Regional Order,” Australian Journal o f  International Affairs 53:3 (1999) 253.
^  Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 20.
Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 21.
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2.5 Security Through State-Making and Nation-Building
Third World security scholars, in general, established a relationship between the twin 
processes of state-making and nation-building and Third World security. Mohammed 
Ayoob’s contribution is of significant importance, since his work is based on an in- 
depth analysis of this relationship. According to Ayoob, a large majority of conflicts 
in the international system can be explained by focusing on the premier political 
endeavor of state-making in the Third World which constitutes the primary cause and 
the beginning point of these conflicts.^^® Therefore, he develops a theory that places 
the process of state-making and the building of political communities at its center by 
examining the history of state-creation in the Third World under the light of the 
preceding European experience. His theory, namely ‘subaltern realism’, seeks to 
“combine the fundamental insights of classical realism with an appreciation of the 
dynamics of conflict currently clearly visible in large parts of the international 
system.”^^ ’ The choice he makes in favor of classical realism emanates from classical 
realist thinkers’ primary interest in the formation and ordering of political 
communities (domestic order) as well as their sensitivity to international order issues. 
He argues that “classical realism captures the security predicament of the majority of 
the states in the international system that are currently at an early stage of the state­
making process more clearly and honestly than either neorealism and neoliberalism 
does.”^^ *
conceived as both the cause of and the panacea for the prevailing insecurity in the
Third World.
^  Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 34. 
Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 43.
268 Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 40.
Ayoob treats the states in Western Europe and North America as “finished” 
products and argues that today’s modem states “went through a long period of 
gestation before they acquired their functional capacities as well as the legitimacy 
they have today in the eyes of the populace that they encompass territorially and over 
which they preside i ns t i t u t iona l lyHe argues that the only commonality between 
these states and the states in the Third World is their formal possession of juridical 
statehood. Unlike the centuries available to most European state-makers to complete 
their process of state-making, the various stages of state making and nation building 
are compressed into a combined and drastically shortened time frame of only three or 
four decades in the case of the Third World. It has put today’s Third World state 
makers imder tremendous pressure and sped up the process of central state power 
accumulation as well. According to Ayoob, this difference in the pace of state 
making “provides the primary explanation for the sharp internal challenges to the 
centralizing state structures in the developing countries and for the high level of 
violence endemic in the current phase of state making in the Third World.” ’^° 
Adopting the terminology of Azar and Moon, he argues that due to the inadequate 
time that has been available for state makers in the Third World, the elites of these 
states failed to develop the ‘software’^ ’' side of national security including the 
identification of the populace with the state (legitimacy) and the identification of
Ayoob, “The Security Problematic o f  the Third World,” 266.
™ Ayoob, “The Security Problematic o f  the Third World,” 269.
Azar and Moon argue that the realist paradigm has traditionally focused on the two variables of 
national security management: security environment (external threat and alliance pattern) and the 
availability and readiness o f  hardware (physical capabilities such as military and economic power, 
tangible policy infrastructure comprising strategic doctrine, force structure, intelligence, weapons 
choice and etc.).They suggest that attention needs to be paid to the software side o f  security 
management, which involves “the political context and policy capacity through which national values 
are defined, threats and vulnerabilities are perceived and assessed, resources are allocated, and 
policies are screened, selected and implemented.” They regard the software side o f  national security as 
the conversion mechanism linking security environment and hardware to the final policy outcomes 
and the overall security environment, and point out its most useful components as legitimacy, 
integration and policy capacity. See Azar and Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: 
The ‘Software’ Side o f TTiird World National Security,” 77-78.
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people with each other (integration), and had frequent recourse to the ‘hardware’
instruments of security (military force) to meet the political challenges from
alienated groups within their populations?^^
Moreover, the enterprise of Third World state making is not conducted in a
vacuum, and external variables had tremendous influence in determining the
outcomes of specific attempts at state building. This is a factor that further
exacerbates the security problems of Third World states. The technologies of
communication and destruction of the contemporary era have reached such a level
that renders the impact of international military, political, economic and
technological forces more influential than they were in any previous historical epoch.
This “makes a substantial and substantive difference to the fortunes of the state
making enterprise and to the larger security problematic of Third World states”.^ ’^
Ayoob also touches upon a very important point that the history of state
creation in the Third World has always been subject to major external influences and
determinants. He underlines the fact that, because of the colonial experience of most
Third World societies, external factors have traditionally had a predominant
influence in shaping their polities and their security environments.
In fact, it would not be wrong to say that many Third World states, 
particularly in Africa and the Middle East but also elsewhere in Asia, 
emerged into the postcolonial era as sovereign entities with recognized 
boundaries only because they had been consolidated into separate 
colonial proto-states by the European imperial powers in the nineteenth 
century.^ '"^
He argues that decisions taken by colonial powers for reasons of administrative 
convenience or intraimperial trade-off had major consequences for both the internal 
and external security of Third World states. The ethnic mix inherited by many 
postcolonial states and the creation of new communial identities have constituted the
Ayoob, “The Security Problematic o f  the Third World,” 267-268. 
Ayoob, “The Security Problematic o f the Third World,” 271.
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internal challenges to their boundaries and institutions, and the emergence of many
postcolonial interstate conflicts. Ayoob further notes that
unlike their counterparts in early modem Europe, political entities in 
the Third World that have emerged into independence have had no 
choice in determining the organization of their polities according to 
their felt needs. They have been obliged to adopt the model of the 
sovereign, territorial state (with the corollary that every state must 
evolve into a nation-state) as the exclusive form of organization to 
order their political lives...The sovereign state, having triumphed over 
its competitors several centuries ago in Europe, had become the only 
legitimate form of political organization sanctioned by the international 
system and it was the benchmark of a political community’s existence. 
Therefore, sovereign state-making became absolutely imperative for 
the participation of the Third World countries in the international 
system. Building states and controlling them became synonymous not 
only with political order but with political existence itself.^^^
For Ayoob, since no other institution can provide order that is essential for routine
social interactions to be stable and predictable, the state forms the cornerstone of
tolerable political life within discrete political communities. Following this path of
thought, the road map for weak Third World states is “to create political stmctures
that approximate to a much greater degree than at present the Westphalian ideal type
by increasing both their effectiveness and legitimacy.” ’^  ^He presents it as the only
way that the postcolonial states can provide stable political order domestically and
participate on a more equal footing in writing and rewriting the rules of international
order.^’  ^ He also perceives the strengthening of the Westphalian order as the only
way for the effective management of most conflicts in the international system.
According to Ayoob, the states of the Third World are subject to diverse pulls
and pressures as a part of their interaction with the international system. The
international system requires them to create effective institutions in a much shorter
reasons for the internal (in)cohesiveness of the Third World states, the intensity of
Ayoob, “The Security Predicament o f  the Third World,” 271. 
Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 41.
Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 40.
Ayoob, “The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 39-40.
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time compared to their European predecessors in order to be able to act as ftill 
members of the system. On the other hand, it compels them to emulate the behaviour 
of the established members by internalizing their value system. International norms 
“require the state elites to treat the domestic opponents of the state humanely.” ’^  ^
Ayoob argues that these norms enforce standards of ‘civilized’ behaviour on Third 
World states which are mostly fragile and weak polities incapable of carrying out 
even the minimum function of maintaining political order. These contradictory 
demands leave many Third World states that are trying to adjust to the international 
system in a perpetual state of schizophrenia.^*®
Buzan is one of the authors that equate long-term securily of the Third World 
with the creation of stronger states. He sees this task as “the only way in which the 
vicious circle of imstable states and an unstable environment can be broken.” *^* He 
holds weak state structures of the Third World responsible for the conditions of 
insecurity of their citizens, and for the insecurity of the broader region. He argues 
that although the existence of stronger states would not by itself guarantee security, 
their continued absence will doubtlessly undermine both security in the Third World 
and international security as a whole. This is due to the fact that the presence of weak 
states and continued instability in the Third World not only constitutes a threat to its 
own peace, but also a threat to the security of the North, which is seriously 
endangered by the risk of being dragged into Third World conflicts.^*^ Yezid Sayigh 
also proposes a similar route for Third World states. He notes that these states have 
been exposed to various forms of external pressure, manipulation and intervention 
because of their internal vulnerability. According to his argument, these states can
Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 49.
Ayoob, “The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 45.
Ayoob, “The Third World in the System o f States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?,” 76. 
Buzan, “People, States, and Fear,” 40.
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achieve social and economic development and promote a stable security environment
only by consolidating their nation-states and developing viable political systems. He
xinderlines the primary task of these states in the post-Cold War era as to achieve
greater integration and viability within the international system “without suffering
unacceptable dimunition of sovereignty”.^ *^
Likewise, Caroline Thomas highlights nation-building as an important
dimension of the internal security of Third World states whose success or failure has
great implications for both these states themselves, and for regional and international
relations and security. She argues that the problems suffered by most Third World
states and especially the ones in Africa, which emanate from the artificial and self-
serving territorial boundaries, will not be solved “until either nation-building within
states totally succeeds, or until the central governments of various states are strong
enough to impose their will on all parts of their territory”.^ *'* She notes that
[i]f the problems associated with nation-building in the Third World 
are to be ameliorated, with positive effects at the domestic, regional 
and international levels, then states must embark on efforts to endow 
themselves with the attributes of separate, individual nations. Political 
allegiance must be transferred from lower levels of group identity to 
the national system, and governmental authority must receive 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Nation-building must be seen 
as a valid attempt to consolidate the authority of, and to secure the 
continued existence of, a new state. Until this is achieved, a new state 
cannot act as a viable political unit in the international scene.^*^
In her examination of the Tanzanian example of nation-building, Thomas reaches the
conclusion that national integrity by itself does not make a state an influential actor
in world politics. However, the lack of national integrity increases the temptation of
external powers to intervene. Therefore, the success of the nation-building process
Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 40. 
Sayigh, “Confronting the 1990s,” 12-13, 54.
Thomas, “Conclusion: Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts,” 177. 
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renders the state advantageous in its struggle for increased autonomy, economic
'yOfi
development and security.
To summarize, the process of state-making (and nation-building) is 
considered as a significant aspect of Third World secxirity. Through an examination 
of the history of state creation in the Third World in comparison with the European 
state-making experience, these arguments suggest that the peculiarities of this history 
constitute the root cause of the Third World security predicament. International 
systemic pressures that emanate from their late entry into the Westphalian states 
system and demands of mass politics inside render this already thorny process more 
difficult in the Third World.^*’ To achieve security. Third World states should 
complete the twin processes of state-making and nation-building as soon as possible, 
in a much shorter time than their Western counterparts.^** As discussed, the central 
concern that lies behind these arguments is “...to bring the Third World state up to 
the Westphalian standard, by correcting its distortions, weaknesses, and lack of 
completeness...[i]n other words...to make Third World states into strong states.” *^^
Because of their internal fragility (especially infrastructural weakness) and 
external vulnerability (mainly their peripheral position in the international economy), 
a whole range of non-military issues turn into formidable threats to the survival of 
Third World states. Economic and social dimensions of insecurity immediately come 
to the security picture of the Third World where societies are stricken with poverty 
and individuals are living in great misery. As will be examined in the next section, 
this led Third World security scholars to address also these fundamental concerns of
Thomas, In Search o f Security. 35.
Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament 21-45.
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the Third World, and investigate the linkages between security and socio-economic 
development in the Third World context.
2.6 Economic and Social Dimensions of Third World Security
Adopting a comprehensive understanding of security becomes a necessity in the face 
of the Third World experience, where issues like underdevelopment, resomce 
scarcity, overpopulation have been at the heart of insecurity from the outset and more 
intimately linked to the security predicament of the Third World than that of the 
developed coimtries. According to Jeff Haynes, “what separates most Third World 
countries from their Western industrialized counterparts is their peripherality, 
[which] refers to the division of the vast majority of Third World economies from, 
and their subordination to, the pivotal industrial economies of Western Europe, the 
United States and Japan.”^^® In other words. Third World indicates a group of 
coxmtries that constitute the marginalized strata of the international system and the 
term indicates a continous struggle to escape from underdevelopment within the 
ambit of a rapidly changing global e c o n o m y F o r  these countries economic factors 
constitute an immediate determinant of survival and of the relative place that the 
state occupies within the system.^^  ^Accordingly, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the 
emergence of a growing body of literature about Third World security that underlines 
the primacy of a socio-economic development strategy for security. The general 
tendency was towards the incorporation of the real concerns of poorer states—such
Jeff Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction (Oxford and New York: Blackwell, 
1996) 65.
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as the provision of food and basic needs— i^nto academic studies in order to provide 
greater security for Third World in the long teπn?^'‘
Caroline Thomas is one of the authors that has attempted to broaden the scope 
of the discussion of Third World security. She perceives the provision of basic 
human needs as an important dimension of internal (national) security and defines 
security m terms of secure systems of food, health, money and trade. She 
emphasizes that Third World states have found themselves bora into an economic 
structure that worked against their needs and they perceive themselves as locked into 
this structure “fi'om which for many there has seemingly been no escape.”^^® They 
are dissatisfied with the rules of the international trade and their efforts to obtain a 
more secure position in the international trading regime have not resulted in any 
significant improvement.
Third World states also suffer from financial insecurity since most of them 
are burdened by a huge amount of international debt. They have a thorny relationship 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose main fimction is to provide short­
term finance to correct temporary balance of payments problems and to facilitate the 
smooth functioning of the international free-market economy.^^^ The Fund is 
perceived by Third World states as the symbol of the present imjust system. The 
economic policies of the IMF are informed by the liberal— a^nd particularly neo­
liberal since the 1980s—^political ideology. This ideology presents global economic 
integration through the liberalization of trade, investment and finance as the natural 
and universal path toward economic growth and therefore toward development for all
Pettiford, “Changing Conceptions o f  Secxirity in the Third World,” 301.
In her latest writings, Thomas sets comprehensive and equitable development as the precondition 
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h u m a n i t y T h e  IMF has generally used international indehtness as a lever to force 
indebted countries of the Third World to change economic direction. IMF financial 
assistance to governments of ailing economies comes with a panoply of conditions 
known as stabilization packages and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). They 
have enormous social and political costs for these countries which lack sound 
welfare systems to cushion their populations against the harsh consequences of these 
policies that include the lowering of trade barriers, reduction in subsidies and price 
controls, privatization of state-owned enterprises, minimization of the provision of 
social services and implementation of deflationary policies.^^^ Hence, the adjustment 
programmes imposed by the Fund have been the main obstacle to the achievement of 
basic welfare and the provision of basic needs such as food, shelter, health and 
education.
Issues of food and health security deserve great attention because the most 
fundamental cause of insecurity for the great majority of people in the world, mostly 
the ones in the Third World, stems from the fact that these two most basic needs 
cannot be fulfilled. According to Thomas, the food problem in the Third World 
where overpopulation is a widespread phenomenon appears more as a problem of 
distribution than one of availability. Starvation and muhiutrition—^primary causes of 
poor health together with the lack of clean water— i^s a man-made situation related to 
ownership and exchange in addition to production possibilities. At the domestic 
level, landownership, particularist interests and ethnic dimensions can determine who 
eats and who starves. At the international level the policies and activities of global 
governance institutions and multinational corporations intensify food insecurity.^®” In
Thomas, In Search o f Security. 39-42.
Thomas, Global Governance. Development and Human Security. 13.
Haynes, Third World Politics. 84-85. 
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the field of health care, profit-maximization motivated multinational drag companies 
further complicate the already complicated picture in which drags reach only a very
ЭЛ1
limited segment of the population.
The widespread inability of Third World governments to fulfill the basic 
needs of their populations have directed attentions to the relationship between 
security and development.^”^  Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat examines the relationship 
between the physical qxiality of life and the level of security in a state and argues that 
there emerges a negative correlation between the two unless the government 
responds to the psychological needs of the population through greater distributive 
justice and democratization of the political system. To put it in another way, the 
failure to accompany improvements in basic needs with greater political participation 
results in an increase in instability.
The same point is also elaborated by Korany and Thomas. They agree that all 
Third World countries have immediate necessities such as increasing per capita 
income, a fairer distribution of wealth and the provision of basic needs as food, 
health and education. However, Thomas maintains that “in contrast to 
industralization pattern of the older, advanced Western states, development is 
expected to take place in Third World states before the unity of the nation is really 
under way.” ”^"^ Moreover, generating balanced economic growth is a long-term 
process but Third World populations are impatient to receive the benefits of 
development. There emerges a widening gap between mass demands and the 
capacity of political systems to cope with these demands. Unsatisfied expectations
Thomas, In Search o f Secimtv. 106-117. For arguments that link food and health security with 
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result in social frustration in the Third World. In Korany’s words, “even Third World 
states that can do well in the enterprise of economic development are not guaranteed 
escape from the spectre of political instability and insecurity.” ®^^ Economic and 
social development is regarded as a double-edged sword which carries the risk of 
political instability for Third World governments.^®®
Thomas points to another danger and argues that the pattern of economic 
growth militates against unity in many Third World states since the benefits of 
development are often differentially enjoyed by particular regions, ethnic groups, 
political party members and government officials.^®  ^ She argues that the success of 
states, measured in terms of GDP per capita, is not reflected in the societies at large 
and this aggravates socio-economic divisions within weak states. Stratification at the 
intrastate level becomes an additional source of social tension and unrest. Ayoob 
points to the same issue by arguing that increasing economic disparities in both 
absolute and relative terms between the developed and underdeveloped states and 
between the rich and the poor within Third World states renders the issue of elite- 
mass identification within Third World countries an impossible task to achieve and 
increases the alienation of large segments of society both from their ruling elites and 
from the state structures that these elites control.^ ®®
Ali HilM Dessouki is another author that investigates the linkage between 
security and development in the Third World context in general and in the Arab
Thomas, In Search o f  Security. 2.
Bahgat Korany, “National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence o f  Dualism,” in The Arab 
World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 171.
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world in particular.^*® He takes underdevelopment as a frame of reference which is
bound to influence security conditions and policies in the Third World. He presents a
developmental perspective on security which he defines in opposition to the military
perspective, and places issues other than military ones under this category.
Accordingly he identifies three interrelated elements of the developmental dimension
of (national) security in the Third World: the contradiction between societal
fragmentation and the need for security consensus, the crisis of low
institutionalization and weak legitimacy, and asymmetry between increasing
population and available resources. What he calls the ‘developmental dimension of
security’ roughly corresponds to the ‘software side of national security’ that was
discussed in the previous section. He argues that this perspective demonstrates the
link between internal and external aspects of security and the importance of non-state
actors (different social and political groups contending for security and international
institutions like IMF) in threat perceptions and security policies.
Moreover, he borrows from the terminology of peace research and makes a
distinction between negative security and positive security.
The negative meaning refers to the prevention of war and the existence 
of relative balance of power between states and blocs. The positive 
meaning refers to the termination of violence in all its forms—^physical, 
structural and psychological. In this view, security is a process and 
condition of human self-fulfillment and social welfare. Like peace, 
security promotes the values of equality, fairness and distributive 
justice; its normative aspects aspire for a human world, a world whose 
security ultimately rests on the quality of its social relations.^**
For Dessouki, positive security can be achieved through development. However, he
refrains from establishing a linear or causal relationship between development and
security and maintins that development may not necessarily lead to security in all
See All E. Hillal Dessouki, “Dilemmas o f Security and Development in the Arab World: Aspects 
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situations. Like the others, he directs attention to the destabilizing effects of 
development and modernization. His argument suggests that these two processes 
carry the risks of unleashing social forces in new directions with potential spillover 
to other countries, increasing the potential for arousing group sentiments and creating 
an environment for communal conflicts. He also argues that economic development 
is a necessary but insufficient condition for the maintenance of security, and that it 
should not be separated from policies of distributive justice and avenues for political 
participation. However, he notes that accompanying political development, 
understood as democratization, may cause further instability in these coimtries. 
Although democratic structures are more conducive to stability and security, political 
pluralism and multipartism may lead to political paralysis and ftirther fragmentation
‘I't'y
in an already fragmented society.
Ayoob expresses the same concern and claims that “democratization by itself 
is unlikely to solve the problem of conflicts within states unless it is accompanied by 
a concentration of the instruments of violence in the hands of the state.” For 
Ayoob, security enjoyed by the state together with the maintenance of internal 
political order is the precondition for development.^*“* This is in sharp contrast with 
the arguments that perceive development as a prereqxiisite for security. Besides, he 
argues that economic and social issues such as debt burdens and famine can become 
integral components of the security calculus in the Third World only if they become 
acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten “the survivability 
of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or dramatically weaken the 
capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of politics, both
Dessouki, “Dilemmas o f Security and Development in the Arab World,” 82. 
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domestic and international.” He criticizes Thomas for offering a too-broad 
definition of security which is analytically useless and politically dangerous.^*^ This 
criticism rests on the idea that an expanded threat agenda will overload Third World
1^7regimes when they are still busy providing internal order.
2.7 Conclusion
Chapter II has argued that Third World security scholars considered the Third World 
as a distinct collective entity and a separate security realm, and Third World states as 
a different categoiy of international actor. They drew a distinction between the 
security needs and interests of the states in the Third World and those in the West. 
They aimed to re-conceptualize security for Third World settings and from Third 
World states’ point of view. Their studies focused on domestic variables and regional 
factors peculiar to the Third World in order to better capture the complex nature of 
Third World security needs. These studies also examined the impact of the 
international system, its norms and structure on the security condition of the Third 
World.
The writings of Third World security scholars have provided an alternative 
framework for analyzing various dimensions of the Third World security 
predicament through addressing a whole range of issues not found in traditional 
analyses. Their work has made significant contributions to the academic field by 
bringing the analysis of the state back into Security Studies, broadening the security 
agenda, and emphasizing the role of existing power structures (especially the 
structure of the international economic system) in engendering insecurity in the Third
 ^1 ^
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World.^** These writings constitute a crucial corrective to the external-oriented Cold 
War conceptions of security and shed light on the neglected domestic political
-l 1 Q
dimension of insecurity in the Third World.
There is a consensus among these writers that Third World states face a 
struggle in every dimension of their domestic activity and also face a great challenge 
in consolidating their state structures. Since these weak state structures are 
considered as the cause for Third World states’ internal and external vulnerability, 
their work has generally been preoccupied with strengthening these structures and 
maintaining political order and stability. The economic and social elements of 
security have been elaborated within the parameters of this political framework and 
according to their political outcomes. They continued to place the state at the center 
of their analyses and have been concerned, to a great extent, with the security of the 
Third World state. In other words, their analyses remained largely state-centric. The 
criticisms directed at the works of Third World security scholars, and the alternative 
views are examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III: CRITICS AND ALTERNATIVES
3.1 Introduction
The end of the Cold War opened up both political and academic space for a critical 
review of long-held assumptions about politics and security. It fuelled the already 
existing discontent with the way security was conceptualized during the Cold War 
and served as a catalyst for a revival in security thinking. The post-Cold War era 
has witnessed lively debates within the academy in general and within IR in 
particular, about how the concept of security—contested even during the Cold 
War—should be reformulated to adapt to new circumstances.^^* The disciplinary 
debate over the object of study has been accompanied with discussions on the 
content and piupose of the sub-field of Security Studies.
Established ways of thinking about security have been challenged by a wide 
range of perspectives in the post-Cold War era. Academics who were critical of the 
statist and positivist assumptions of traditional security thinking expressed the need 
to problematize the ‘state’, to rethink the nature of the ‘political’, and to reflect upon 
the process of ‘theorizing’ itself in Security Studies.^^  ^ For these scholars, “the 
traditional assumption that security could be xmderstood and practiced within an 
inter-state framework...is no longer...considered fit for the study of the security 
problems faced by a variety of actors around the globe.”^^"* Studies provided by these
Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f  Security,” 207; Buzan, “ ‘Change and Insecurity’ 
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scholars offered an understanding of International Relations that does not restrict the 
terrain of study to political relations between nation-states, but rather takes into 
consideration various patterns of political relations between states as well as non­
state actors that characterize contemporary world politics. They pointed to the 
security problems faced by non-state actors besides states and put emphasis on the 
individual, societal and global dimensions of security
These scholars also subjected the arguments developed by Third World 
security scholars to critical scrutiny, pointing out their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. This chapter aims to present these criticisms and point out the issues 
that were not addressed by Third World security scholars. It builds upon the 
alternative conceptualizations of security offered by critical approaches and makes 
use of their insights on Third World security.
This chapter is divided into four sections. Each section begins by 
problematizing the concepts, categories, processes and assumptions on which Third 
World security scholars built their arguments. Then, examples of alternative 
xmderstandings are provided. Accordingly, drawing upon the studies of critical 
scholars, the first section investigates the origins of the concept of ‘Third World’, 
questions its explanatory power as a category for analysis and presents the possible 
consequences of over-reliance on this category. It examines the linkages between the 
concept of ‘Third World’ and the development discourse, and reflects upon the 
relationship between policy making and academic research in the context of Third 
World theorizing.
The second section examines the arguments of Third World security scholars 
on the process of ‘state-making’, whose completion is perceived as the precondition
325 Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f  Security,” 207.
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for security in the Third World. The section is based on a critique of the underlying 
understanding which ignores the continuity of this process, projects an evolutionary 
path for Third World state formation that is identical to that of Western states, and 
fails to take into consideration different possible trajectories for the state-making 
enterprise. Benefiting from the works of critical scholars, it presents alternative 
understandings of state formation that account for historical specificities and 
variations between state formation in different contexts and direct attention to how 
different types of state-civil society relations relate to the process of state-making.
The third section focuses on the concept of security. It is structured around 
five key questions (‘What is security?’, ‘Whose security?’, ‘What threats does the 
security agenda include?’, ‘Which principle is the organizing concept for security 
policies?’, ‘What are the agents of these security practices?’) whose answers 
constitute the ground for a critical analysis of the assumptions underlying the 
conceptions of security provided by Third World security scholars. It also elaborates 
the answers offered by critics and argues that they are more able to address the real 
security concerns of individuals and social groups in the Third World.
The fourth section casts a critical eye on the strong-state argument and its 
implications for regional security in the Third World. Drawing upon the works of 
critical security scholars, it presents an alternative regional security perspective that 
incorporates the idea of building regional security communities and suggets moving 
beyond Westphalian state forms in the search for security.
3.2 “Third World” as the Object of Study
As Chapter II showed. Third World security scholars consider the Third World as a 
distinct collective entity and Third World states as a different category of
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international actor. While acknowledging the existence of diversity—especially on 
economic grounds—among this group of states, these scholars argue that the 
similarities between them exceed their differences and there remain compelling 
criteria for using the term ‘Third World’ as an analytical category. Mohammed 
Ayoob defines Third World as “the vmderdeveloped, poor, weak states of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America”^^® and argues that the term “has assumed a life of its 
own” independent of its original usage to distinguish the rest of the world from the 
advanced capitalist states of the First World and the centrally planned states of the 
Second World. He contends that while the end of the Cold War rendered the terms 
First World and Second World redundant. Third World retains its conceptual
'I'yn
relevance because of the persistence of its distmctive charactenstics.
Within this framework, the experience of colonial rule, a fractured social 
order, extreme weakness in economic, military and technological capabilities 
compared to the industrialized states of the West are regarded as objective criteria for 
the continued existence of a ‘Third World’ The most important objective criterion 
is the striking similarities between these states’ security predicament and the 
common experiences they share in the security arena, because the chronic insecurity 
and vulnerability these states face are the determining conditions of their foreign and 
security policies. Additionally, the subjective criteria point to these states’ sense of 
belonging to the same category and their conception of a common identity which is 
based on a perception of peripheralization and victimization.^^^
On the other hand, after the 1970s, the demise of collective solidaity in the 
Third World and the weakening of the ties that bind these states raised the question
Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament 12.
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of whether a cohesive Third World coalition still existed. Forums provided by Third 
World states, such as the G-77 and the NAM, did not live long. Since the 1970s, 
which saw the climax of Third World efforts at international economic reform with 
the laimch of demands for a new International Economic Order, the collective 
bargaining power of the Third World has been drastically reduced. It has been argued 
that the Third World has become less homogenous due to the wide and growing 
diversity within and between this group of states. This has raised the question as to 
whether the category ‘Third World’ might be an impediment than an aid to 
analysis.^^®
The conceptual category of ‘Third World’ is a locus of contention between 
Third World security scholars themselves. The term has been mainly criticized for 
reflecting the structural hierarchy of the Cold War global system which created the 
Third World problems. As MacFarlane maintains, “the recent literature proposes 
numerous alternative terms to describe this group of states, among them the ‘South’, 
in a North-South dichotomy; the ‘Periphery’, in a ‘Core-Periphery’ juxtaposition; 
and the ‘Developing States’, in a ‘Developed-Developing’ dyad.”^^  ^However, these 
options have also received various criticisms. It is argued that ‘the South’ is 
essentially a geographic expression and some states which are categorized under the 
label ‘the North’ (e.g. Australia, New Zealand) are in fact located in the geographical 
south.^^  ^ Peripherality in the world capitalist economy offers another basis for a 
definition of the Third World. However, it creates a boundary problem likewise; 
since some Third World states appear to be leaving the periphery and joining the 
core (e.g. the Southeast Asian states) while there exist reasonably well-defined
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periheries within the core (e.g. the Scottish Highlands, the Canadian Maritimes, 
Appalachia, and the decaying urban peripheries of many American and European 
cities).^ '^* The term ‘Developing States’ is criticized on a rather different ground, for 
having a connotation of development towards some pre-ordained end state or goal 
which is devoid of a clear definition.^^^ In the end, for most of the Third World 
security analysts the ‘Third World’ has remained as their central category for 
analysis.
In the social sciences, general theoretical categories are useful for capturing 
common elements. Therefore, the merits of using the category of ‘Third World’ and 
its explanatory power are recognized to an extent. However, like all categories, it 
suffers from the exceptions. Krause gives the examples of the newly industralized 
countries of East Asia and the case of Latin America (where independence was 
gained from the colonial powers a century earlier than the African and Asian states 
and therefore more progress has been made at nation-building) as posing difficulties 
for this classification.^^® Ayoob does not neglect this point and takes pre-emptive 
measures against possible criticisms by underlining the fact that “the concept of the 
Third World may suffer from a degree of inexactness and may be surrmmded by 
controversy. This is more true when the concept is applied to cases that fall at the 
margins of this category.”^^  ^ Therefore he defines the concept as having flexible 
boundaries which “helps the analyst use the term to encompass marginal and recent 
cases without losing sight of the contested nature of the concept’s application to such
cases «338
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Nevertheless, the main criticism asserts that over-reliance on the concept of 
Third World results in the reification of this category. As Krause argues, the potential 
danger here is that it can serve to “reinforce Western tendencies to see these regions 
as an xmdifferentiated zone of turmoil contrasted to the Northern zone of peace.”^^  ^
In other words, it bears the possibility of strengthening the Two-Worlds view which, 
according to Buzan, traditionally carries a strong element of inequality and can be 
perceived as a formal attempt to classify Third World states as ‘xmeqiM’.^ '^ ® Pmar 
Bilgin and A. David Morton have argued that the practical implication of the Two 
Worlds approach is that it obscures the mutually constitutive relationship between 
the two spheres. '^*  ^ It fails to question the historical process through which security in 
the zone of peace emerged at the expense of insecurity at the zone of conflict. This 
understanding also lacks appreciation of certain practices within the global political 
economic context (such as arms exports from the ‘zone of peace’ to the ‘zone of 
conflict’) that sustain the imequal structural relationships between the two zones. 
Instead, becoming ‘strong’ and joining the ‘liberal’ world is presented as the only 
alternative for the ‘weak’ states of the world. A similar kind of criticism goes for 
the literature’s unquestioning adoption of and over-reliance on the category of 
‘weak’ state, its continual reference to ‘absences’ of Third World histories and 
preoccupation with ‘failures’of Third World states to replicate the Western 
experience.^“*^ These are criticized for lacking a critical examination of the colonial 
experience of these states and “the aftereffects of the unequal encounter with
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Western colonialism,” '^  ^ therefore, missing the crucial point of how “these states 
have become ‘weak’ while other gained ‘ strength’
Viewing the concept of ‘Third World’ with critical lenses, Bilgin and Morton 
argue that the term reflects “particular ways of thinking about, acting upon and 
(re)presenting post-colonial states, which, in turn, facilitated certain policies while 
m a rg in a lis in g  others.”^^  ^ According to the writers, the study of the non-Westem 
world imder the label ‘Third World’ is a continuation of the imperial understanding 
and the Orientalist approach which gave an intellectual backing to Western 
domination over these lands by helping to keep the distance and reinforcing
•  347inequalities between the Western colonial powers and peoples of the colonies. 
During the Cold War, the hegemonic pretensions of the USA urged US social 
scientists to produce knowledge about the non-industralized world. Hence emerged 
the development and modernization models, and various attempts to apply it to the 
states imder the crude classification of ‘Third World’. The political development 
literature was the product of a certain relationship between policy making and 
academic research whose primary task was “engendering a ‘doctrine for political 
development’, based on containing demands for mass participation as a prelude to 
the dissemination of liberal democracy throughout the post-colonial world.” The 
corollary aim was producing knowledge that would “enable the maintenance of 
political control over societies that threatened the institutional capacities of ‘Third 
World’ states.” '^^  ^ Since US strategic interests favored securing elite power and 
m ain ta in in g  obedient and depoliticized civil societies open to capitalism, these works
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underlined the importance of strong state capabilities within post-colonial states to 
shape and contain societal forces and establish political order. Moreover, as Bilgin 
and Morton maintain, state strength was simplistically reduced to an “emprically 
observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in an anti- 
democractic overtone of control and subordination.”^^® State political institutions and 
societal forces were persistently coimterpoised in these studies while specific 
patterns of state-society relations in post-colonial states were overlooked.
The work of Bilgin and Morton reflects upon the relationship between policy 
making (power) and academic research (knowledge) in the context of “Third World” 
theorizing, and illustrates clearly how various representations of post-colonial states 
enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and security interests of 
those who employ them. Their piece investigates how ‘Third World’ was 
constituted and reproduced through the production of knowledge, discursive 
practices and certain policy preferences. The writers argue that ‘Third World’ is one 
of those generic representations that abstracts the post-colonial state fi'om its socio- 
historical context. And more importantly, it bears the potential to facilitate certain 
security practices while marginalizing the security interests of social groups and 
individuals living in these states. In a similar way, Arturo Escobar contends that the 
production of the Third World through the articulation of knowledge and power, and 
with the help of the discourses and practices of development creates an image that 
universalizes and homogenizes socioeconomic, cultural and political specifities / 
particularities of post-colonial states in an ahistorical fashion. Even worse, this
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 63.
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image creates certain mind-sets that do not seem to go away. As Escobar states, even 
today most people in the West (and many parts of the Third World) have great 
difficulty thinking about Third World situations and people in terms other than those 
stereotypical signifiers (such as underdevelopment, overpopulation, poverty, famine, 
illiteracy and the like) that are provided by the development discourse.
These critical voices suggest moving beyond oversimplified categories and 
grand generalizations and indicate the need for the reconstruction of post-colonial 
states through alternative representations that can develop into alternative practices. 
According to Bilgin and Morton, this can be possible with a more historicized 
understanding of post-colonial statehood which takes into consideration historical 
and contemporary circumstances that have been constitutive of these states.^ "^* This 
argument links this section to the next one, which questions the assumption that 
Third World states need to follow the Western model of state development m order 
to achieve security.
3.3 Understanding of the State-Making Process
Academic studies that examine the relationship between the process of state-making 
and Third World security, which are mostly advanced by Mohammed Ayoob, are 
appreciated for their inclusion of the historical dimension of state formation in 
analyzing the security predicament of Third World states, and therefore for thek 
acknowledgement of the historicity of security.^^  ^ However, they are criticized 
mainly on two grounds. Fkst, it is assumed that the process of state-making has a
Escobar, Encountering Development 12.
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definable end point. This is evidenced in Ayoob’s treatment of the Western state as a 
“finished” project. However, a critical understanding asserts that state formation (and 
transformation) is an ongoing process. After all, the state is always in the process of 
being constituted and re-constituted by the practices of statecraft and never arrives at 
a final moment of completion.^^^ This is not the case only for Third World states but 
for every state. As Sorensen puts it.
There is no point where states can sit back, relax and exclaim, ‘We are 
finally there! We have made it to strong statehood, let us go no 
further.’ Both juridical and substantial aspects of statehood change 
over time in response to the external as well as the internal interplay 
between states and societies. Current changes in Western Europe 
exemplify these developments. They point to a situation in which the 
military threats is in increasing retreat, while there are new dangers and
security problems to confront. 157
Keith Krause argues that if Ayoob had recognized the continuity of this process, his 
analysis of state-making would not have been confined to the Third World but the 
entire problematic of Security Studies would have been recast, for both the North and 
the South, around the concept he develops.
Another flaw related to the historical end point argument is Ayoob’s 
ahistorical understanding of legitimacy. In a way similar to his conception of the 
Western industralized states as ‘complete’, he argues that these states and regimes 
which preside over these state structures have, unlike their Third World coimterparts, 
acquired ‘unconditional’ legitimacy in the eyes of their own citizens. He sets it as the 
ideal to be approached. Nevertheless, it reflects a static understanding of legitimacy, 
which, once gained, becomes fixed and invariable. However, in contrast with 
Ayoob’s assertion, conditionality lies at the heart of legitimacy. The claim of the
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state to loyalty and legitimacy is conditioned by its ability to remove organized
violence from political life, to provide at least the minimal conditions for order, and
to support some measure of representativeness in its political institutions. Thus,
the legitimacy of a state or a regime may be lost if they fail to fulfill the conditions
mentioned above. The issue of legitimacy, like the state and state formation, is
located in an evolving context and is subject to historical change.
Second, Ayoob is criticized for projecting an evolutionary path for Third
World state formation that is identical to that of Western states.^ ^® Smith argues that
Ayoob’s understanding “involves a teleological assumption that Third World states
need to follow the Western model of state development.” ®^* According to Krause,
Ayoob’s Western-centric presentation of state-making is
a linear process that can be compressed or extended, but which has 
only one outcome. This argument echoes now-discredited 
modernization theory and is in harmony with a Waltzian realism that
sees statis after the historical crystallization of the state system, 362
However, critics suggest that it is a mistake to posit parallel historical paths between 
the European experience of state formation and that of the Third World. Drawing on 
the works of Charles Tilly and Robert Jackson, they argue that Third World state 
formation will be different from Western state formation because it is occurring in a 
different historical context.^ ®  ^ Although Ayoob does not neglect circumstantial 
differences, he insists on replicating the historical experience of European state­
making in a much shorter time.
Nevertheless, as Bilgin reminds, the Western European state-building 
experience was “a long, brutal and often violent process” in which “there is very
Georg Sorensen, “Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal 
Prohlem.” Secimtv Dialogue 27:4 (1996) 380.
Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 133-134.
Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 132.
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little...to be idealized.” ®^^ According to Barnett, by perceiving the use of force as an 
integral part of the state-making enterprise that inevitably accompanies the process of 
state consolidation, Ayoob gives political backing to state repression carried out in 
the name of state-making.^^^ When compounded with his explicit argument that any 
outside interference is both unwelcome and covmterproductive when Third World 
leaders are still busy with state-making, Ayoob’s move sounds like a request for 
Western states to txm a blind eye to intrastate violence and predatory behaviour of 
some ruling regimes in the Third World for the purposes of consolidation of state 
authority.^ ^^ This is why Barnett criticizes Ayoob’s theory for being in alliance with 
authoritarian leaders that oppress their people in the quest for domestic order.
Moreover, Krause criticizes Ayoob for failing to benefit adequately fi-om the 
valuable insights provided by scholars of state formation on the complex matrix of 
state/society relationship and different possible paths for the state-making 
enterprise.^ ^* Ayoob borrows mainly from the work of Charles Tilly regarding the 
historical experiences of state-making in Western Europe.^ ®® As summarized by 
Krause, the main argument of Tilly’s work is that the main impetus for consolidation 
of national states in Europe was preparation for and actual fighting of wars. The need 
of the state-makers to extract and mobilize resources fi-om the society in order to feed 
their war machines resulted in the development of new political and socio-economic 
institutions; in other words, professional bueaucracies. Although state-makers started
Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 132.
Barnett, “Radical Chic? Subaltern Realism: A Rejoinder,” 61; Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 132. 
Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 108.
Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 61.
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Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 61.
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For the original work o f Charles Tilly, see “War-making and State-making as Organized Crime,” 
in Bringing the State Back in, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Coercion. Capital and European States. AD 990-1990
by extracting sources for war-making in return for providing security to the society 
against both internal and external threats, over time this required the forging of 
broader alliances with the society. The bargain between agents of states and civilian 
groups that controlled these resources gave the civilian groups enforceable claims on 
the state and resulted in a civilianization of government and domestic politics.
According to Krause, while it provides a valuable analysis of the European 
state-making process, “Tilly’s European ‘model’ of state-formation had many 
historical variations and...does not encompass the only possible historical paths for 
newly-independent or emerging states.” ’^* He points to three analytic difficulties of a 
straightforward application of this model to the developing world. First, its 
evolutionary dynamics do not work in quasi-states. Since their judicial sovereignty is 
sustained by international norms, they are not affected by the contradictions of their 
polities and societies. Second, the model fails to explain the emergence of rentier or 
predator states such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia or other resource-rich new states. Since 
these states have autonomus revenue sources, they do not need to extract sources 
from their population and do not need to negotiate their state power with social 
groups. Instead, state power is imposed on the society. Third, different international 
circumstances in which most post-1945 states undertake their state-building projects 
(characterized by the extreme subordination, dependence and powerlessness of these 
states, and the general absence of major interstate wars) prevents the creation of 
states in the strict European image.^ ^^
An alternative understanding of state formation is found in Bilgin and 
Morton’s study. Accoxmting for historical specificities and variations between state
(Cambridge: Basic Blackwell, 1990); The Formation o f  National States in Western Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975).
Krause, “Insecurity and State Formation,” 325-326.
Krause, “Insecurity and State Formation,” 326.
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formation in different contexts, and accomodating state-civil society relations in a 
broader framework of production relations and accumulation processes, they direct 
attention to how social forces relate to state formation.^ ^^ Building upon the work of 
Antonio Gramsci, they argue that an understanding of ‘integral state’ provides an 
opportunity to re-conceptualize the process of state-formation and to consider 
different forms of state.
The state should be understood...not just as the apparatus of 
government operating within the ‘public’ sphere (government, political 
parties, military) but also as part of the ‘private’ sphere of civil society 
(church, media, education) through which hegemony functions.^ "^  ^
“Hegemony” is the keyword here, which expresses
a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas— i^n 
Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure— i^n which 
power based on dominance over production is rationalised through an 
ideology incorporating compromise and consensus between dominant 
and subordinate groups.^’^
When the state is perceived, from a Gramscian perspective, as the instrument through 
which ruling social classes establish hegemony, then alternative scenarios for state 
formation appear as a result of the struggle over hegemony between social forces. 
Benefiting from the works of Jean François Bayart and Crawford Young, Bilgin and 
Morton cite possible scenarios of state formation for post-colonial states under the 
light of their distinct historicities, political trajectories and social foundations. These
are
scenarios of “conservative modernisation”, where already established 
groups maintain their power (ie Nigeria, Burundi); “social revolution”, 
where the downfall of dominant groups might transpire (ie Zambia, 
Rwanda); “paroxytic repression”, based on a recurring lack of 
hegemony (ie Angola, Chad, Mozambique); or, most likely, the 
“reciprocal assimilation of elites”, indicating the absorption of
Krause, “Insecurity and State Formation,” 326-327.
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 70-74.
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 71.
Robert Cox, “Labor and Hegemony,” International Organization 31 (1977) 387. 
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 71-73.
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challenges to dominant elites through state-civil society relations (ie 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania).377
In contrast to the conventional understanding that separates the state from civil 
society, this alternative understanding conceives the post-colonial state “in relation to 
the social structure on which it is built.” ’^* The authors further assert that this is not a 
static analysis of state formation. Far from that, it is a generative conception of state 
formation that is cognisant of the fact that this process is subject to both specific 
historical conditions and contemporary influences.^’® They also emphasize the role of 
informal networks in places where bureaucratic state institutions cease to fimction 
effectively. They note the possibility that these patrimonial networks, which already 
operate as shadow states (such as warlordism in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zaire; clan- 
based forms of identity in Somalia, or other ethnic and religious forms of identity 
including kinship and witchcraft) may reorganize political authority and create
alternative forms of sovereignty with their practices.380
3.4 Conceptualization of Security
Academics from critical perspectives draw attention to the derivative character of the 
concept of security. They maintain that our conceptions of security depend on the 
particular philosophical and political worldview we have.^ *  ^ In other words, often 
unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical inclinations shape our xmderstanding of 
what and to whom the term security refers.^*’ Ken Booth and Peter Vale argue that 
answering the questions ‘What is security?’, ‘Whose security are we concerned
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 73.
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 72.
Bilgin and Morton, “Historicizing Representations,” 73.
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with?’, ‘What threats is the security agenda composed of?’, ‘What is the organizing 
concept for security policies?’ and ‘What are the agents of these security practices?’ 
is not a value-free, objective matter of describing the world ‘as it is’. Instead, it is a 
profoundly political act that has enormous implications for the theory and practice of 
security in specific places.^ ®  ^Drawing upon these arguments, this section focuses on 
different answers given to these five questions. It examines the assumptions that 
underlie these answers and their theoretical and practical implications for security in 
the Third World. Especially the first three questions are closely intertwined, therefore 
they will be elaborated on together.
When Mohammed Ayoob’s formulation of security is elaborated within this 
framework, it is observed that his definition of security is “explicitly political in 
character.” *^'* Since the state is the primary actor of his conceptualization of political 
space, he restricts the definition of security to the political sxirvival and effectiveness 
of states and regimes, and defines the concept in terms of how state institutions and 
regime survival will be affected.^ *  ^However, Krause criticizes Ayoob for conflating 
state security and regime security, and maintains that playing down the differences 
between these two is analytically unhelpful within the Third World context. 
According to Krause, there is no explanatory value in placing the case of Africa in 
the same category with South America since threats are directed to the state 
structures that possess only low levels of legitimacy in the former, whereas threats 
are mostly directed to the authoritarian and repressive regimes rather dian state 
boimdaries and institutions in the latter. Moreover, he indicates that these cases have 
different implications. Different prescriptions might be made in each case, for
Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity,” 335. 
Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 130.
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‘^regime insecurities can be caused simply by the behaviour of the regime itself, 
while state insecurities have deeper...roots.” *^®
Ayoob’s conception of ‘the political’ from which he derives his 
imderstanding of security, has also received criticism for being too narrow and
"XStnprivileging the state. First, borrowing from the work of David Easton, Ayoob 
maintains that “political life concerns all those varieties of activity that influence 
significantly the kind of authoritative policy adopted for a society and the way it is 
put into practice.” *^* He defines ‘the political’ as “the arena of human activity that is 
concerned with ‘the authoritative allocation of values for a s o c i e t y . B e c a u s e  he 
thinks that it is the ‘state’ which is, or is “supposed to be”^^ ° engaged in this 
business, he places the state at the center of his analysis. However his conception of 
political is based on an understanding that separates the public sphere from the 
private sphere of (civil) society^^* in which the state is perceived only as the 
apparatus of government operating within the public sphere. Therefore, his 
understanding of security does not incorporate the security needs and practices of 
civil society. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, critics maintain 
that the realm of the political is inseparable from the realm of civil society within 
modem states. According to this line of reasoning, rather than restricting the 
definition of the state to the government apparatus, the state should be perceived also 
as a part of the private sphere of civil s o c i e t y I f  the meaning of political is
Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 129.
Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 129; Booth, review o f The Third World Security Predicament. 603.
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extended to include the network of complex social and economic relations, 
institutions and practices of groups and individuals in a society as such, a more 
comprehensive imderstanding of security can be developed.
Second, Ayoob equates security with order and perceives the state as the
“sole and indispensible provider of order within territorially organized polities.”^^ ''
 ^ 10^
Therefore, the state becomes the primary referent of security in his studies. 
However, as Bilgin notes, giving primacy to the security of the state just because it is 
the state that acts for security is confusing agents and referents, and therefore means 
and ends.^ ^® Stamnes and Wyn Jones also underline that while states may in some 
cases be providers of security, and are regarded as an important element in the 
politics of security, this does not mean that they should be privileged as referents for 
the theory and practice of security
The answer to the question ‘whose security?’ frames the threat agenda. As a 
result of accepting the state as the ultimate security referent, Ayoob resists the 
creation of a broader security agenda and does not address threats that are relevant at 
levels of individual and group living other than the state.^ ^* He opposes an expanded 
concept of security that includes its horizontal (economic, societal, gender and 
environmental issues as well as political and military) and vertical dimensions (the 
security of individuals, relevant groups of all kinds including states and hiunankind
Bilgin and Morton, “Historizing Representations,” 69-71; Thomas, Global Governance, 
Development and Human Security. 5-7.
Ayoob, “The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 39.
Ayoob, “Definmg Security,” 129.
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Drawing upon ¿ e  work o f Medley Bull, Ayoob explains his lack o f attention for the security 
concerns o f  social groups and individuals in the Third World on the grounds that “the international 
system has not yet progressed from being and international society to that o f  a world society.” Ayoob, 
“The Case for Subaltern Realism,” 46. According to Bull, ‘international society’ is composed o f  
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as a whole).^ ®  ^His rejection is based on the assumption that without the provision of 
internal political order by the state, every other form of security remains elusive, and 
social and individual values cannot be realized.“^®® Mustapha Kamal Pasha is critical 
of Ayoob’s assumption that state security will provide the achievement of other 
societal goals in the Third World. On the contrary, he argues that the pursuit of 
security through state-making and nation building has neither created a more viable 
and democratic polity nor a vigoruos civil society in the South Asian case. Even 
worse, civil society has bought into the agenda of the ‘national security’ project and 
has become the site of reproduction of statist discourses.“*®^
Ayoob is criticized for presenting a statist conception of security which 
prioritizes the security concerns of the states and its representatives while 
marginalizing those of individuals and social groups in the Third World.“*®^ 
According to Michael Barnett, this understanding celebrates postcolonial states in a 
way that completely excludes their citizens. He suggests that Ayoob’s theory fails to 
represent the ‘subaltern’ because his framework does not express the concerns of the 
‘less powerfiil majority,’ but serves to silence them. Instead, Ayoob’s perspective 
elevates the interests of Third World regimes which find themselves beset by 
security challenges, and are obsessed with preserving an order that benefits them. 
Even worse, it is the societal groups and individuals— t^he true subalterns, which are
states. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977).
Barry Buzan made the key move to broaden the security agenda by presenting a framework that 
encompasses political, economic, societal, environmental dimensions o f  security as well as the 
military sector. He also mentioned the sub-state (the individual) and supra-state (international system 
as a whole) levels o f  security. Nevertheless the state remained as the referent object that stands at the 
interface between the secxirity dynamics operating at these two levels. See, Barry Buzan, People. 
States and Fear CBrighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983).
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constructed as ‘threats’ by these regimes."^ ®^  Ayoob defends his argument on the 
grovmds that his main task is to explain “the dominant concerns of Third World state 
elites and the major determinants of Third World state behaviour.” *^^  However, as 
Booth and Krause maintain, it does not justify his problematic conception of security 
which sacrifices reality at the altar of analytical neatness.'^ ^^
The crucial problem with this understanding is that it is not in accordance 
with the emprical picture since “the most important threats to security in the Third 
World arise from  states and regimes, and are directed against individuals and 
communal groups.” “^® The case study of Bunmdi by Eli Stamnes and Richard Wyn 
Jones clearly illustrates that any attempt to privilege the state as the provider of 
security is “simply grotesque” *^’^  in the Burundian context because the state with the 
minority-ruled government has been the major source of insecurity for the greater 
proportion of its population ever since it gained its independence in 1962. The Hutu 
majority has been excluded fi’om public life, knowledge and wealth, and on several 
occasions the state’s armed forces have carried out masssacres against the majority in 
which tens of thousands have been slaughtered and many others have been forced to 
flee the country.'^ “* Another example is provided by Ken Booth and Peter Vale’s 
analysis of southern Africa which indicates that the state has been the main problem 
rather than a solution, and state security has often been hostile to human security in 
the southern Afiican context. They maintain that the states in this part of the world 
do not match the textbook images of Anglo-American political science and they
Barnett, “Radical Chic?” 56-57.403
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“have not stood as reliable watch-keepers over the security of their inhabitants.” °^^
Additionally, they remind as of the fact that during the apartheid years, ‘national
security’ for the South African state meant security only for the white minority and
insecmity for the vast majority of citizens.'**®
Behind these criticisms lies an imderstanding of security which gives primacy
to the security of human beings over that of states. It signals a change in the referent
of security. Security scholars adopting critical lenses acknowledge that ‘human
security’ is the primary concern for the overwhelming majority of people on this
planet,*** and the state is the major source of insecurity for the lives of the people in
many parts of the world. In Booth’s words.
For many people and groups in the world, their chief security threat is 
the very government under whose sovereignty they live, either through 
its power and oppressive policies, or as a result of its incapacity to
sustain the infrastructure of life for everybody. 412
According to Caroline Thomas, the state is not the only form of ‘existing power
structures’ which she holds responsible for human insecurity. She argues that
Human insecurity is not some inevitable conseqimce...Rather, [it] 
results directly from existing power structxires that determine who 
enjoys the entitlement to security and who does not. Such structures 
can be identified at several levels, ranging from the global, through the
regional, the state and finally the local level 413
When examined under the light of Thomas’s arguments, the operation of these 
structures become even more obvious in most parts of the Third World, where 
discrimination and oppression is widespread and extreme insecurity is manifested in 
areas of life that are not usually considered to fall within the purview of traditional 
security specialists (such as provision of basic needs, economic deprivation.
Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Inseciuity,” 333.
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environmental degradation, mass migration and refugee flows, drug traffic, social 
injustice, human rights violations, internal violence and politics of identity).'* '^* 
According to the proponents of critical approaches, if the lack of provision of basic 
needs such as subsistence, housing, health and education, or oppressive power 
structures (whether at the local, national or global level) are the main sources of 
insecurity for, and have life-and-death relevance to, many people on the planet, and 
if the search for security is an attempt to create a less threatening structural context 
for life’s ordinary struggles, then these issues should be included in the security 
agenda.'**  ^ Therefore, they favor a horizontally and vertically expanded notion of 
security to have fuller agendas that covers all those issues that endanger insecurity.'^ *® 
As Booth and Vale maintains,
[i]f we are serious about human rights, economic development, the lot 
of women, and so on— a^ll priority security problems for somebody— 
then we must simply accept the problems of an expanded agenda. We 
must ask why some security experts might want to keep an issue such 
as human rights or environmental matters off the security agenda. We 
must ask it with more than normal curiosity if the person concerned is a 
supporter of the region’s traditional insecurity establishments.'**’
Since the term security has an enormous political significance, placing an issue on a
state’s security agenda gives it priority. Booth and Vale acknowledge that a
broadened security agenda risks becoming overloaded. However, they assert that it
cannot be a justification for leaving the agenda in the hands of traditional security
specialists that maintain statist, militarized and masculinized definitions of what
should have priority in security terms. After all, they think that placing threats in
order of priority is a problem that has to be resolved in the political process 418
Stanmes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 40,49.
Booth, “A  Security Regime in Southern Africa,” 6.
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However, scholars of critical security do not simply confine their task to 
broadening the scope of the subject matter. In fact, they expressed explicit 
dissatisfaction with the way “new issues and challenges are being subsumed under 
old (and imexamined) approaches,” *^^  such as broadening the security agenda, but 
staying within a realist framework,'*^® or expanding the concept of security to include 
domestic security concerns while retaining a Two-Worlds vision."^ ^^  Building upon 
this understanding, in addition to supporting moves to broaden notions of security, 
critics have also called for its deepeningf'^^ Deepening can be explained as 
“investigating the implications and possibilities that result fi'om seeing security as a 
concept that derives fi’om different understandings of what politics is and can be all 
about, and specifically, politics on a global scale.”^^  ^ These scholars reject the 
definition of politics that places the state and its sovereignty at the center of the 
subject and the belief that the state is and should be the key guardian of people’s 
security. Methodologically, they reject the presumptions of positivism and favor an 
approach which reflects on the process of theorizing itself and raises the possibility
Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause, “Preface: Toward Critical Security Studies,” in Critical 
Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Michael C. Williams and Keith l6uuse (Minneapolis: 
University o f  Minnesota Press, 1997) xix.
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since inside is assumed to be anarchic now, but threats coming from outside— at least from the zone 
o f conflict— cannot be eliminated. Accordingly, expanding the concept o f  security to include domestic 
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of choosing a different perspective.'* '^* Thus, a deepened understanding of security 
“involves a shift from a political perspective rooted in the status quo to one that 
conceives security in terms of change. I t  “dislodges the state as the primary 
referent”^^  ^ and embraces multiple referents that are in need of security. It also 
accepts that human security is ultimately more important than state security, and 
perceives states as the means, not the ends of security.
This imderstanding is in sharp contrast with the zero-sum notions of the Cold 
War era, and recognizes the fact that the security of the state is not necessarily 
synonymous with the security of everyone living within that state, and is even less 
synonymous with the security of those living in other states. It acknowledges that 
when the security of some is at the expense of others, tension is predictable; therefore 
the correct policy to pursue is one that aims to achieve security with others, not 
against them. This cooperative, holistic conception of security embodies an 
alternative conceptualization of the political which is based on inclusion rather than 
exclusion, and opennes rather than closure.'*^’ Critics argue that this understanding is 
more compatible with the security picture of the Third World where internal and 
external dimensions of security are closely linked with each other. It is also more in 
accord with the necessities of contemporary world politics marked by 
interdependence and globalization, since security cannot be secured by the 
application of traditional national security practices in most cases and many 
significant threats can only be dealt with through cooperation.
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The fourth question, ‘What is the organizing concept for security policies?’
(which principle, or value, is security eqiiated with) constitutes another important
point for inquiry. As discussed in Chapter I, traditional security studies have
privileged power, order, and the preservation of the status quo in security policy.
Mohammed Ayoob adopts this vision and equates security with order. On the other
hand, critical voices suggest that the quest for power and order cannot produce
genuine security because “absolute power implies no change, and where there is no
allowance for change, there is unlikely to be justice.”^^  ^Similarly, a particular status
quo can deliver order; but in many parts of the world justice requires change.'*^”
The alternative organizing principle introduced by critics is ‘emancipation.’'*^ '
It is defined as “the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical
and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose
to do.”^^  ^Those constraints involve war and the threat of war, together with poverty,
poor education, political oppression and so on. The term refers to
an open-ended and ethical conception of politics, the rejection of false 
necessities in social life, justice as fairness, empowerment and choice, 
mutual respect of rights, the acceptance of common duties, and the 
promotion of world-order values such as economic justice, 
nonviolence, humane governance, ecological sustainability, and human 
rights.'*^^
Booth reconceptualizes seciuity as a process of emancipation and argues that 
privileging emancipation as the main value leads to a focus on people, justice and
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change.'* '^^  He maintains that emancipation can also be conceived as a theory of 
human self-creation and a guidance for a politics of resistance.^^^ According to Wyn 
Jones, it corresponds to a commitment to the development of unfulfilled potential 
within the actual conflict situation."^ ^  ^ In this sense, the struggles of the oppressed 
majority in South Africa and the people of southern Africa to emancipate themselves 
fr*om the apartheid regime and racism exemplifies the ways emancipation is 
operationalized in practice.^^’ However, it is also emphasized that emancipation does 
not have a fixed and timeless meaning, since it may mean different things to people 
fr’om different cultural surroundings and socio-political contexts. It is not a static 
concept, but contains a theory of progress and is a condition of becoming. As 
material and other conditions change, so will the goals of emancipation. Therefore, it 
is more suitable to use the term in its adjective form, as “emancipatory politics,” 
since it implies movement rather than a condition of being.'^ ^^
Mohammed Ayoob criticizes the notions of emancipation and emancipatory 
politics for encouraging divisiveness, carrying a neocolonial bias and tending to 
impose a model of contemporary Western polities that are far removed from Third 
World realities.'^ ® He argues that while security may be equated with emancipation 
in Western Europe, “it is intellectually disingenuous to do the same in the case of 
Third World where basic problems of state legitimacy, political order, and capital 
accumulation are not only far fr-om being solved but may even be getting more 
acute.”^* Ayoob confines the meaning of emancipation to ‘the right of every ethnic 
group to self-determination’, and argues that its practical implication is disorder and
Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 297.
Ken Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 46.
Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory. 24-27.
Booth and Vale, “Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity,” 337-338. 
Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “Security Studies: The Next Stage?” 153. 
Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 43-46.
anarchy for Third World states.“^ ^ However, as highlighted above, the concept of 
emancipation cannot be restricted to a static, fixed meaning because it is assumed to 
be ‘continuously c o n t e x t u a l . I n  other words, “different peoples in different 
cultural surroundings and socio-political contexts will attach different meanings the 
idea.”^  Ayoob’s vision comes from his state-centric lenses and his narrow 
conception of the political. Nevertheless, emancipation has little to do with state­
making; on the contrary, it hints at the diffusion of power above and below the state 
level and the creation of alternative political communities.'^ ^ Moreover, Booth 
underlines the point that while the conception of emancipation recognizes the 
contributions of Western thinking in developing ideas on human flourishing, it 
cannot be simply equated with Westernization. He argues that such an act woiild be 
contrary to the spirit of emancipation in which there are no final answers and nobody 
has a monopoly of ultimate truth."^^ In Booth’s words.
There is no reason to suppose that what is taken as Western society 
today represents the best of all possible words, not least because that 
society does not attain its own best standards, is full of hypocrisy, and 
in relation to the rest of the world, many of its citizens flourish without 
questions in the midst of injustice.'*^^
In a way that responds to Ayoob’s criticisms. Booth further notes that if 
emancipation is seen as timeless, or as a cloak for Westernization, it is false 
emancipation.“^* In the end, as Smith concludes, the clash of Ayoob’s and Booth’s
Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 126-128; 140-141. 
Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 127.
Ayoob, “Defining Security,” 127.
Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 41.
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^  Booth, “Three Tyrannies,” 42.
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107
visions is a matter of whether one sees the state or the individual as the referent point 
of security
Finally, the last question, ‘Who are the agents of security practices?’, leads to 
a reconsideration of the agency problem in Security Studies. Traditional 
conceptualizations of security do not pay attention to the agency of non-state actors 
(such as social movements, non-governmental organizations and intellectuals) in 
providing for different security needs of those other referents. This is also evidenced 
in the works of most Third World security scholars.'*^® However, the state cannot be 
assumed as the only agent for security because there are different agents at different 
levels that act to promote both their own and wider security. The examples of the 
1980s peace movements, 1990s environmental movements, and the case of the 1989 
revolutions in Europe are illustrative of how social movements—especially when in 
relationship with intellectuals—can help in moving beyond statist, military, and zero- 
sum practices of security and bring about change.'*^* Other various examples show 
that
[w]here some humanitarian groups operate at the domestic level, others 
cross borders to provide famine relief (e.g. Oxfam). Some movements 
operate beyond borders to help bring change at home (e.g. Palestinian 
groups or the Chiapas) whilst others are transnational both in character 
and scope (e.g. Greenpeace, Amnesty International).'*^^
Bilgin maintains that the organized activities of these non-state actors (referred as
‘foreign policy from below’ or ‘grassroots statecraft’) aim to influence both tiieir
Steve Smith and Amitav Acharya, “The Concept o f  Security Before and After September 11,” 
Institute o f  Defense and Strategic Studies Working Paper, 23 (2002) 5., available at 
http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idssAV orkingPanersAV23 .ndf. Accessed 24.3.2003.
The work o f  Caroline Thomas is an exception, where she calls for the participation o f  civil societal 
actors in policy-making at the global level. She also argues that policies imposed by global 
governance institutions (such as the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organi2ation) and 
adopted by national governments can be altered by the organized resistance o f  non-state actors to 
power structures existing at different levels. Thomas, Global Governance. Development and Human 
Security. 13-21; 46-52.
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own and other governments to alter their foreign and security policies. In this way, 
they pose a direct challenge the top-down perspectives of Cold War security 
thinking. Moreover, “by connecting the personal, political and international, they 
introduce a new understanding of what it means to act politically.”^^ '*
Revisioning security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies 
perspective, Bilgin directs attention to the agency of women’s movements and 
networks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which aimed at bringing alternative 
futures. Drawing upon the works of Simona Sharoni and Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, 
she demonstrates that the Intifada movement can be perceived as a politics of 
resistance on the p a l of Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women in which their cross- 
border cooperation demonstrated itself in the “adoption of non-statist, non-military 
practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political 
communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities.”'*^  ^ She 
further notes that their activities included organizing conferences which brought 
Palestinian and Israeli women together, and taking direct action to alleviate the 
condition of Palestinians, in which they were aided by their Western European 
coimterparts in terms of financial, institutional and moral support.'*^ ®
In a similar way, Stamnes and Wyn Jones argue that civil-society based 
initiatives, such as the establishment of a multi-ethnic radio station, have great 
importance in transcending ethnic boundaries and therefore helping to prepare the 
ground for a general process of communication and reconciliation in Burundi. The 
establishment of the Center for Women is also viewed as a hopeful development.
Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f  Security,” 216. See also, Pearl-Alice Marsh, 
“Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens’ Challenges to U.S. National Security Policy,” in On Security, ed. 
Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 124-148.
Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, “The Next Stage?” 154.
Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 111.
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whose efforts range from providing administrative infrastructure and meeting 
facilities, to training women from different regions and ethnic communities in 
peaceful conflict resolution techniques. They argue that including individuals and 
groups—^who are not traditionally considered as political actors— i^n the 
commxmication process has an enormous effect on reinforcing and dynamizing the 
negotiations taking place at both national and provincial levels.“^ ’^
However, it is important to note that these alternative views do not suggest an 
imcritical reliance on the agency of non-state actors.'^ ^* Booth points to the agendas 
and practices of some associations—fascist groups, some fundamentalist religious 
sects, and so on— t^hat can subvert the process of security building and bring about 
the very opposite the civilizing of international politics, which he defines as the 
delegitimizing of the use of force and the promotion of common human values like 
peace, human rights and justice,"^ ^® When handled within this context, the case of 
some Islamic grass-roots movements appears rather problematic. As Bilgin 
maintains, certain Islamic movements and organizations, such as the Islamic 
Salvation Front in Algeria and Hamas in Gaza, offer an alternative social 
infrastructure (like the provision of food, education, medical treatment and 
employment opportunities) that delivers security to some people who are often 
neglected by their own states for political or infrastructural reasons. On the other 
hand, the violent practices they adopt, often as a part of their strategies that are 
designed to capture the state mechanism, constitute major threats to the security of 
some others."^ ^®
Stamnes and Wyn Jones, “Burundi,” 50-52. 
Bilgin, “Re-visioning Security,” 23.
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At this point, Bilgin argues, the role of intellectuals becomes crucial in 
serving as “guides for social movements to lead them to defy traditional forms of 
resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state 
power or that adopt zero-sum practices.”^^ * Having a special and privileged position 
within civil society, the roles intellectuals may play range from teaching and writing 
to getting personally involved in social movements. Likewise, Booth defines the task 
for academics as
to provide new knowledge and more helpful accounts of world affairs 
and human lives;...to expose the hypocrisies, inconsistencies, and 
power plays in language, relationships, and policies;...to engage in 
dialogues with policy makers in order to try to open the latter’s 
imaginations and minds about the ways in which concepts might be 
translated into better (more friendly to people and nature) policies; to 
expose false ideas and reveal the imstated assumptions of policies; to 
open up space for thought and action; to help students think for 
themselves; to develop new and more rational theories about global 
security; to cast a critical eye on all theories and all exercises of power, 
including one’s own; and to speak for cosmopolitan values and to 
speak up for those who do not have a voice.'*®^
He also directs attention to how the teaching of history has served a variety of social
and political fimctions in all southern African countries, especially in South Africa
where history teaching was intimately associated with the perpetuation of apartheid
regime."^ ^^  Taking into consideration the influence academics have on generations, he
asserts the need for the idea of teaching a history which stresses the importance of
regional cooperation and brings ordinary people to recognize that understanding their
shared past is part of the guarantee for a shared future.'^ ®  ^This understanding rests on
the idea that human beings can learn to see themselves as potential common victims
Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 112. 
Booth, “Security and Self,” 115.
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of life’s dangers rather than as potential victims of each o th e r F u r th e r  alternative 
views on regional security will be examined in the next section.
3.5 Strong States, Reification of the Westphalian Order and Regional Security
As examined so far, Buzan and Ayoob equate security with ‘strong statehood.’ 
According to their arguments, long-term international and domestic security requires 
weak states of the world to become stronger (Buzan), and the inadequate states of the 
Third World to be given time and space to develop their effective and legitimate 
political apparatuses capable of providing order within their territories (Ayoob).'^ ^  ^
According to Richard Wyn Jones, Buzan does not remain blind to the fact that states 
are often a source of danger to their own citizens. However, he argues that the 
problem is not states themselves but rather particular kinds of states. Buzan’s 
argument suggests that individual security can be obtained where “strong states” 
(states with a higher degree of internal stability and cohesion) coexist in a “mature 
anarchy” (a developed international society composed of strong states).'*^’
The attempt to distinguish between strong and weak states is acknowledged 
for its move beyond traditional analyses which assume that the state is a unitary and 
unproblematic actor."*^ ® However, both the logic of the strong state argument and its 
relation to the theory and practice of security receive various criticisms. First, 
although the need for building strong states is argued within the Third World context, 
the underlying assumption is that the strong states of the developed world—Western 
liberal democracies which are perceived as models to be approximated by the Third 
World—are successful providers of security. It renders the argument refutable from
Booth, “A Security Regime in Southern Africa,” 17; Booth, “Security and Self,” 109. 
^  Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 106-107.
Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy, and Critical Theory, 113.
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within, because “the record of strong states in the developed world does not always 
back Buzan and Ayoob’s arguments regarding the desirability of building strong 
states when viewed from the perspective of individuals and social groups.”^^  ^ As 
Tickner states
Buzan’s claim that strong states can successfully provide security 
might be challenged by marginalized groups such as women and 
minorities, whose economic security is often compromised when 
military security takes priority...even strong states implement dubious 
policies that are not always formulated democratically.^’“
Moreover, if a few ‘strong’ states are able to provide relatively more security for
their citizens, this is due to their privileged position in the international economic
system, “which further deepens the economic insecurity of some others who live in
the peripheries of the world.” ’^^
Ayoob defines adequate stateness as “a balance of coercive capacity, 
infrastructural power, and unconditional legitimacy.” ”^  Critics acknowledge the 
need of Third World states to strengthen their infrastructures and boost their 
legitimacy." ’^  ^However, bearing in mind that the process of state consolidation itself 
is a thorny one, the attempts to strengthen the state apparatus often end up increasing 
coercive power in a way which detrimentally affects the security of other potential 
referents at the sub-state level."^ ’  ^ In practice, the reasons of (strong) state-building 
and national security discourse become the pretext for coercive behaviour on part of 
the state."*’^
The strong-state argument is further criticized for having highly 
uncomfortable implications in multi-ethnic regions. Booth argues that one possible
Bilgin, “Beyond Statism,” 108.
Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” 186.
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corollary of the concept for southern Africa is ‘ethnic cleansing’ due to the racist and 
hypemationalist logic persistent in the region.“*^® Second, bearing in mind that 
security literally begins at home in this region. Booth and Vale maintain that “those 
states that can successfully organize diversity will be better able to adapt to the 
demands of global interdependence than those which look towards the twenty-first 
century with simple nineteenth-century ethnic nationalist identities.” ’^  ^ In other 
words, the fear of fragmentation should not preclude the celebration of diversity and 
multiple (often overlapping) identities in a region such as southern Africa which
A inoffers a perplexing patchwork of states and identités.
Ayoob expresses the principle concern of the Third World states as “moving 
toward the ideal of the effective and legitimate state that can become the true 
repository of sovereign power as envisioned in the Westphalian discourse.”^^  ^ For 
him, the sovereignty regime seems better than the imaginable alternatives; although 
it does not promote equality, it at least reduces growing inequalities by protecting 
Third World states from economic and political penetration of powerful external 
forces.'**® He further asserts that moving beyond Westphalia and creating regional 
confederations based on weak states cannot be a remedy for the security problems of 
Third World states.“***
As indicated above, the strong-state argument is the reification of the 
Westphalian order, because according to its imderlying assumption, the sovereign 
state is the only legitimate form of political organization for a community to exist. 
This imderstanding obscures some of the post-Westphalian opportunities for wider
Booth, “A Security Regime,” 9-10.
Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 298.
Booth and Vale, “Regional Insecurity,” 349-350.
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patterns of governance and excludes the consideration of more positive future 
alternatives including decentralized and regionalized ones."^ *^  Critics maintain that 
states are social forms that were created at a particular place and time in history due 
to particular needs, and thus, can be uncreated in the face of different needs.'**  ^ It is 
argued that the very creation and the defense of the Westphalian state form is at the 
heart of regional insecurity for the most parts of the Third World. Therefore, 
sovereignty appears as both a source and a site of insecurity that has to be 
problematized. Hence, any political project which regards the Westphalian state form 
both as a given and a locus for the realization is claimed to be “inherently flawed.” *^"* 
In a case study of southern Africa, Larry Swatuk and Peter Vale point to the fact that 
the states of the region—^unlike the ones established under the Treaty of 
Westphalia—^were imposed by colonial powers which disarticulated historical 
regional relations and disunited the region’s people while serving the interests of 
these foreign powers. In this sense, “independence” and the acceptance of colonial 
boundaries reinforced the foreignness of policy decisions. As Swatuk and Vale 
maintain.
The practice of Westphalian-state foreign policy has always been 
destructive in the region...entrenching regional elites whose 
antidemocratic tendencies were justified in terms of defending the 
“national interest”. Foreign policy, then, has rarely been about people 
or fostering human security; it has always been about ensuring the 
security of material things, thereby fostering elite continuity.'**^
They argue that wealth coming from valuable and adundant minerals has allowed
state-makers to continue to maintain the fiction of the Westphalian state-form in the
Barry Buzan, review o f The Third World Security Predicament by Mohammed Ayoob, in 
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region. In each case, minerals have made borders and entrenched elites, but have had 
little actual positive impact on the lives of these states’ citizens. Furthermore, 
interstate rivalries and regional insecurities deriving from race-specific nationalist 
struggles have allowed state-makers to cloak the defense of their more particularistic 
ethnic and class-based interests in the holistic language of “state security” and 
“national interest.” *^® As a consequence, people whose needs are marginalized are 
increasingly turning to other loci of identity (to warlords, religious movements, 
renewed tribalism, and family relations) for assistance and support. The region is 
increasingly being dragged into fragmentation at a time when many hope to see it 
move toward cohesion.'**’
Critical approaches express the need to reconsider political organization in a 
way that will best deliver security. Thinking in terms of possible territorial 
arrangements, the idea of redrawing borders is often debated in terms of whether it 
would be a remedy for the security predicament of the Third World.'**  ^ For some 
analysts, it holds the potential for creating more stable and cohesive political 
communities and therefore contributing to the building of stronger states. Many 
others reject the idea because it would lead to new boosts of violence and create 
more problems than it would solve. Warning against the potential dangers of 
territorial change and pointing to the costs and violent historical experiences, they 
find it preferable to maintain these unsatisfactory boxmdaries rather than to try and 
change them. Other viewpoints argue that each case has to be taken on its merits. 
However, in multi-ethnic regions (such as southern Africa and the Middle East) 
political life is shaped by the fear of fragmentation. Policy-makers and other state-
Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 369.
Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 373.
Booth, “Security and Self,” 109.
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level actors generally support the maintenance of the status-quo as the primary
territorial principle. Nevertheless, a status quo which provides relative order, but fails
to provide justice, is not likely to deliver security in the long run.'^ °^
Yet, critics do not limit the possibility of change to the redrawing of borders
and creation of new states. Regional community-building—together with the creation
of regional frameworks for governance—exists as another alternative for the
establishment of regional security besides those of fragmentation and maintenance of
the status quo. It offers a viable opportunity for peaceful change and constructive
transformation at a time when regionalization of contemporary world politics and the
rise of regionalism have become the characteristic features of the present stage of
international relations.'^ ®  ^Regionalization can be described as ‘the growth of societal
integration within a region’'*^  ^which
can also involve increasing flows of people, the development of 
multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, 
political attitudes, and ways of thinking spread from one ^ea  to 
another, and the creation of transnational regional civil society.'
Similarly the term regionalism refers to
,493
the proneness of the governments and peoples of two or more states to 
establish voluntary associations and to pool together resources 
(material and nonmaterial), in order to create common functional and 
institutional arrangements.494
These trends can be regarded as a component of globalization, which indicate its 
operation at the local scale. At the same time, they can be seen as responses to
Booth, “A Security Regime,” 8-9.
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globalization that attempt to mitigate its efFects.'^ ^^  One can assume that the product 
of earlier stages of globalization was the universal spread of the Westphalian 
sovereign state as the principal political form, which was designed to promote 
domestic interests and act as a protective barrier against external intrusions.'^ ^^ On the 
other hand, the contemporary era of intensified globalization requires looking beyond 
the confines of the Westphalian state and adopting post-sovereign forms of 
governance by devolving sovereignty, depending upon circumstances, upwards to 
supra-state level (regional governance arrangements) and downwards to sub-state 
level.^ ’^
This shows that forces of fragmentation and integration operate at the same 
time in the contemporary world. Therefore, Booth argues that one should avoid 
making a choice between fragmentation, consolidation or the status quo, but rather 
seek all three in different ways. He suggests that there are some issues (such as 
macro-economics, the environment, migration) which can be best settled at the 
regional level, but there are other issues where power should be devolved below the 
state level to local settings (development, redistribution, culture, education and so 
on). Yet, existing state boundaries can continue to function in different fields, such as 
policing and arms control.^ ^* It can also be argued that such a devolution of power 
will increase direct transborder links and cooperation between sub-state, state and
supra-state actors and contribute to the development of a sense of regional identity.499
and norms...[and] also participate in a growing network o f economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, 
political and military interactions.”
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Swatuk and Vale focus on natural resource management as an opportunity 
that would constitute a locus for a common regional identity and create an alternative 
political space for post-Westphalian forms of governance in southern Africa. The 
recent community-based management of natural resources (CBMNR) projects aim at 
popular participation and people’s empowerment at village level, and involves the 
devolution of authority over natural resources to affected communities in order to 
facilitate the realiaation of shared benefits from natural-resource use.^ ®° These 
projects were government-initiated at first, but later NGOs and rural communities 
themselves came to be involved in all stages and at all levels. While CBMNR 
challenges states to devolve power and restore authority to groups at the substate 
level, Swatuk and Vale highlights water management as another issue that 
encourages active state involvement at sub- and transnational levels. Water, 
besides valuable minerals, has served as a boundary to divide the region into 
juridically acknowledged state forms. Therefore, the creation of water-transfer 
schemes (as long as it privileges the interests of rural people and shows sensitivity to 
the possible effects on the natural environment) is a crucial attempt to transcend the 
Westphalian-type sovereignty and construct an alternative type of sovereignty that 
can be referred as ‘water sovereignty’. It also offers a strong basis for a regional 
identity and cooperation by portraying water as a common property. This radically 
deviates from state-centric analyses that frame issues in binarist terms; such as “owr 
‘state’ must secure our water supplies and, if necessary, do so at the expense of 
Instead, natural resource and water management helps to provide an 
understanding of security that combines common security (security has to be
Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 374-77.
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achieved with others, not against them) and human security (fulfillment of basic 
material and non-material needs of the individual human being as the ultimate 
security referent) approaches for the region.^ ®^
Bringing the notions of security, community and emancipation together. 
Booth conceives regional security as the extension of the notion of community.^ ®  ^
Together with Peter Vale, he argues that “the road to emancipation is through 
community in southern Afiica,”*“® and suggests that the key for the region to 
transform itself into a ‘security community’ lies in the development of a common 
sense of purpose among the region’s peoples. Following the work of Karl Deutsch 
and his associates on security communities,^ ®  ^ Booth maintains that a security 
community is created by
mutual compatibility of values; strong economic ties and the 
expectation of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural 
transactions; a growing amount of institutionalized relationships; 
mutual responsiveness; and mutual predictability of behaviour.^ ®*
A successful security community is reached when states in the region cease to
prepare for war against one another, and sustain stable expactations of peaceful
change. Links of social communication among the members of the region is also
essential for the attainment of security communities.^ ®®
Kacowicz argues that somewhere beyond the nation-state, security
communities offer a possible convergence among the forces of globalization,
regionalization and nationalism. First they are partly motivated by the forces of
globalization, which includes transnational links among people composing different
member states. Second, these people from different states form security communities
Swatuk and Vale, “Why Democracy is Not Enough,” 383.
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without ruling out the political independence of their respective states. Third, by 
establishing regions of common identity, security communities epitomize the trends 
toward regionalization and regionalism.^
Buzan’s concept of ‘security complex’ provides a useful analytical tool to 
start with, when a regional security perspective is adopted.^ * ^  Security complex can 
be defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
apart from one another.”  ^ Bilgin argues that the concept “is useful in bringing 
together a group of states to show their securities are interdependent upon one 
another’s policies” and paves the way for the idea of establishing a security 
community.^ ^^ The region’s peoples starting to see themselves as common victims of 
structural and geographical insecurities rather than as traditional victims of each 
other constitutes a second step.^ *'* This point is elaborated by Bilgin, Booth and Vale 
within Middle Eastern and southern African security contexts. Their argument 
suggests that the potential for these regions to transform themselves into security 
communities passes through a shared understanding of security. For a shared 
understanding to develop, regional actors have to become aware of their own and 
each other’s security concerns and be willing to address them.^ *^
A third step may be the creation of security regimes, as suggested by 
Booth.^ *  ^According to Booth, a security regime “involves the promotion of ‘peace’ 
not through the accumulation of weaponry and the primacy of deterrence but through
Booth, “A Security Regime,” 14-15.
Kacowicz, “Regionalism, Globalization and Nationalism,” 542; Booth, “A Security Regime,” 15. 
Kacowicz, “Regionalism, Globalization and Nationalism,” 542-544.
Bilgin, “Inventing Middle Easts?” 10.
Buzan, “People, States and Fear,” 190.
Bilgin, “Inventing Middle Easts?” 10.
Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 290.
Bilgin, “Inventing Middle Easts?” 10; Bilgin, “Re-visioning Security,” 26-27; Booth and Vale, 
“Regional Insecurity,” 337-342; Booth and Vale, “Security in Southern Africa,” 290-293,300-301.
reciprocity and restarint based on a shared sense of security interdependence.”^^ ’ He 
also notes that rather than a single security regime, “it is instead more helpful to 
think of a complex of different regimes, with each one attempting to deal with 
different but overlapping sectors of the security p r o b le m .T h e s e  security regimes 
on different issue areas may provide a ground for various visions (including those of 
non-governmental actors) to address their principle secmity concerns. At the end, 
diese steps may establish the notions of regionalism and contribute towards building
a security community.519
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter examined the basic arguments of Third World security schol^^ from a 
variety of critical perspectives. It addressed the main criticisms directed at their 
studies. Drawing upon these criticisms, it provided an account of alternative 
approaches to the question of security in the Third World. As demonstrated, critiques 
clustered around elements of static and statist thinking in the literature. Critical 
scholars aimed to de-naturalize the taken-for-granted assumptions, problematize 
oversimplifying categories and historicize fixed concepts by asking how they 
emerged, what their practical implications are, whose interests they serve and which 
policies they help to legitimize. They criticized studies that privileged the security of 
the state “without even raising the question whether or not it should be the proper 
subject of security.” ’^® They suggested that only by asking these questions and 
examining their answers it becomes possible to consider alternative ways of studying
Booth, “A Security Regime,” 11-12. 
Booth, “A Security Regime,” 11. 
Booth, “A Security Regime,” 12. 
Bilgin, “Inventing Middle Easts?” 10. 
Krause, “Theorizing Security,” 129
security and to offer alternative understandings of security that will inform and 
develop into alternative practices and policies.
As demonstrated, not all critiques remained at the theoretical level. Drawing 
on the understanding that security is a “historically variable condition”^^  ^ and “has 
to be defined with reference to a subject (or subjects) situated in a particular time and 
place, and in relation with practice”^^ ,^ some scholars applied their conceptual 
insights to “real people in real places.”^^  ^ Perceiving Third World security as a part 
of a broader framework of global security, their studies focused on the security 
concerns of social groups and individuals living in these most distressed and insecure 
regions of contemporary world politics.
Academics with critical lenses problematized the ‘Third World’ as a 
conceptual category and tool for analysis. They investigated its origins, practical 
implications and explanatory power for the study of security. Their studies 
suggested that over-reliance on this categorization reinforces the Two-Worlds view 
that lacks an appreciation of the historical processes through which the ‘security’ of 
the zone of peace emerged at the expense of ‘insecurity’ in the zone of conflict. They 
further criticized the literature’s exclusive focus on failures, absences and 
weaknesses for failing to reflect upon the colonial background of these states and 
reinforciug stereotype representations that hinder more than they reveal. They called 
for dropping stereotypical signifiers and developing alternative representations of 
‘Third World’ states that can potentially translate into alternative practices and
‘desired futures’ in the Third World, 524
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Proponents of the critical approaches examined the arguments regarding 
Third World state-making which are based upon an understanding of the Western 
state as a ‘finished project’ and an ‘ideal’ to be approached by Third World states. 
On the contrary, these scholars conceptualized state-making as an ongoing process 
which never arrives at a final moment of completion. They also criticized the 
Emocentric and teleological assumption that Third World states should replicate the 
Western experience of state-making. According to this criticism, such line of 
reasoning lacks an appreciation of the radically different socio-historical context 
within which Third World state formation occurs and obscures different possible 
trajectories of state formation that results from these historical specifities and 
variations. Instead, critics argued that the question of state formation in the Third 
World should be elaborated under the light of distinct historicities, political 
trajectories and social foundations of these states. Their work also showed that a 
wider conception of the state, not just as the government but also as a part of civil 
society, provided an opportunity to consider alternative types of state formation.
According to students of critical security, state-centric perspectives do not 
provide a helpful analytical framework to explore the multifaceted security 
predicament of the Third World. By according primacy to states in their analyses, 
state-focused studies help reinforce a statist conception of security which renders 
security needs (as referents) and practices (as agents) of non-state actors, such as 
individuals and social groups, almost invisible. Privileging the state as the primary 
referent and agent of security sharply contrasts with the emprical situation in the 
Third World where human beings suffer fi’om extreme insecurity due to the 
oppressive policies of the state (and other existing power structures) and/or its 
infi'astructural incapacity to provide security for its citizens. Futhermore, at a time
when the Westphalian state system and Westphalian-type sovereignty are being 
problematized and reconsidered all around the world, equating security with strong 
statehood and placing the state at the center of security theorizing and security 
practice, is an even less appropriate way to approach the security problématique of 
the Third World where the state itself is an artificial construct.
Critics have underlined the point that security is intimately linked with the 
process of human development, especially in the Third World context. The 
relationship between security and development was already noted by some Third 
World security scholars. However, scholars of critical security took a further step by 
identifying the individual human being as the primary security referent and equating 
security with human emancipation. They maintained that, to promote human 
security, it is important to address the immediate causes of human insecurity (armed 
militias, corrupt elites, lack of basic food and medical supplies etc.), but this is not 
enough in itself. Long-term objectives should also be set to eliminate the structural 
causes of insecurity (alleviation of poverty, establishment of effective systems of 
education, housing, health care, democratic and accoimtable governance etc.). As 
discussed above, these long-term objectives in particular, the idea of human security 
in general, immediately bring issues of political governance into the security picture. 
It also leads us to reconsider human agency and the potential of alternative political 
communities (local, regional, transnational) besides the dominant form of political 
community, the nation-state, in delivering different aspects of security. The Southern 
Afiican experience is an illuminating one which shows that the people of the region 
have not waited for their governments to act, but have themselves initiated the long 
process of providing security.
Paul Williams, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Getting Critical?” Politikon 27:1 (2000) 73-91.
As discussed in the final section, critics have also directed attention to the 
importance of adopting a regional security perspective for the study of Third World 
security, since the security of most Third World states and their citizens cannot be 
regarded in isolation from the security of those other states and their respective 
citizens in their regions. However, their understanding of regional security is 
radically different from that of Third World security scholars who conceptualize 
Third World regional security as ‘regional relations of weak states’ or present regime 
security concerns as the motivating force of regionalism in the Third World. A 
critical perspective on regional security draws upon the imderstanding that human 
security is ultimately more important than state security. It identifies a particular 
region as the primary security referent and perceives the security of human beings 
and regions as integral components of global security. It incorporates the idea of 
building regional communities and moving beyond self-regarding Westphalian state 
forms and state-makers in the search for security. These scholars maintained that an 
identity that derives from belonging to the same region and facing the same problems 
provides an opportunity to include a multiplicity of identities and to embrace the 
security interests of the marginalized groups and people that are alienated from the 
Westphalian state structures. As opposed to state-building, community-building in 
the regional context implies a shift from the pursuit of national security to an 
approach based on notions of common security, which seeks security in cooperation 
with others. Entailing intensified interactions between regional, state and sub-state 
levels, it opens an avenue for the development of a non-violent conflict culture in 
inter-state relations and moves closer to the realization of long-term human security 
objectives.
CONCLUSION
Shifting our gaze from the few powerful actors in 
world politics to the many who are less powerful may 
help us to revise and strengthen the conceptual 
foundations upon which IR Theory is built, so that it 
better reflects what is happening today. The study of 
‘small’ states may answer big questions.^ ^®
Security Studies has undergone a significant change since it first emerged. The field, 
which has been very closely linked to the state and to the practice of ensuring 
military security, turned to question its own foimdations by problematizing the state, 
rethinking the nature of the political, re-conceptualizing security, and most 
importantly, by reflecting on the nature of theorizing itself. From a narrow 
technocratic enterprise, it became an intellectual platform where security has begtm 
to be viewed as an issue of political philosophy and a guide for strategic action at the 
same time.
This transformation is clearly reflected in the academic study of secxuity in 
the Third World, which is the subject of this thesis. This thesis examined the 
evolution of security thinking on the Third World by exploring the main approaches 
to its study. It showed that each of these approaches aspired to overcome the 
shortcomings of the preceding ones. Third World approaches corrected the 
deficiencies of traditional approaches to a certain extent, whereas critical approaches 
managed to overcome the limitations of both traditional and Third World approaches 
to security. Developments in the study of security in the Third World have also 
contributed the transformation of the field.
Traditional approaches viewed the Third World through the superpower 
template and adopted a military focus. Scholars working within this framework did
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not try to define Third World security issues as distinct from the East-West rivalry. 
This bias resulted from the assumption that Third World states did not possess the 
capabilities to make a significant impact on the international system. As a result of 
this understanding, the Third World was perceived simply as “the backdrop for the 
competition of the superpowers and medium-sized powers and [was] relegated to the 
status of clients who benefit or suffer commensurately with their protectors.” 
Consequently, Third World security problems were treated as a mere extension of 
system-level dynamics.
The political realist (and neo-realist) thought had a number of qualities that 
made it appealing to the states of the North. Most notably, it “legitimized their 
dominant position in the existing international system by equating it with a natural 
state of affairs.”^^ * Yet, the majority of Third World political and security elites were
C‘5Q
coopted into the realist tradition and accepted the security agenda set by the North. 
Security behaviour of Third World governments generally followed the tenets of 
realism, which provided the intellectual background for their statist practices. They 
pursued policies that aimed at enhancing the security of the regime rather than 
dealing with the major sources of insecurity, such as socio-economic 
imderdevelopment and environmental degradation.^^® This “parasitical elite, inducted 
during the Cold War and sustained largely by external aid, has created a vicious 
circle of domestic repression and external dependence.”^^ * Their security policies 
compounded the instability and violence in the Third World.
Neuman, “International Relations Theory and the Third World,” 17. 
Azar and Moon, “Rethinking Third World National Security,” 5.
S28 ,Simpson, “A View from the North,” 35. 
Thomas, “Introduction,” 5-6.
“ “ Achatya, “The Periphery as the Core,” 322. 
Ray, “A View from the Periphery,” 24.
The tendency of traditional Security Studies to focus on a particular segment 
of the international system to the exclusion of another is ironic given the fact that it 
was in the neglected arena that the vast majority of conflicts have taken place. It 
was Third World security scholars who significantly altered this process of security 
theorizing. They placed the Third World at the core of their studies as the central 
category for analysis. These scholars perceived the Third World as a distinct entity 
and separate security realm whose conditions were markedly different fi’om the 
West. According to their argument, these differences—especially the primacy of 
internal threats— r^equired the application of different notions of security to the Third 
World; so security should be re-conceptualized for the Third World context.
The studies of Third World security scholars challenged the ethnocentric 
character of Security Studies through incorporating the experiences and problems of 
Third World states into security analyses. They also challenged the field’s military 
focus by including a wide range of non-military issues into the security agenda and 
addressing the multiple dimensions of insecurity in the Third World. The distinction 
they made between the security needs and interests of Third World states and 
developed states was an important and helpful conceptual move in reflecting and 
studying the security problématique of the Third World. However, these works, in 
general, relied on an essentialist differentiation between states in the Third World 
and states in the West, and postulated a fundamental bifurcation between the Third 
World and the West. Although these scholars had developed an awareness of the 
external dimension of insecurity, they generally regarded weak state structures as the 
root cause of the Third World security predicament. Therefore, their studies were 
concerned with strengthening these structures and maintaining political order and
Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core,” 300. He further notes that between 1945 and 1986,98  
percent o f all international conflicts took place in the Third World.
stability. A strong state was considered to be the most likely organizaton to provide 
long-term domestic and international secnrity. As a result, not all, but most of these 
analyses remained largely state-centric. Security needs and interests of states were 
given the highest priority “imtil governmental mechanisms become strong enough to 
allow them to compete with other states.”^^  ^Thus, they ended up reinforcing a statist 
conception of security and helped to constitute a statist view of world politics.
This conceptual deficiency is corrected by students of critical security whose 
studies are based on an understanding of security which recognizes differences as 
well as commonalities, and is sensitive to diversity but comprehends that “such 
distinctions are not primordial forces.”^^ '* Besides an appreciation of unique 
historical, social and political conditions of different contexts, these scholars 
underlined that “there are fundamental elements of the security problématique which 
are universal.”^^  ^ Their work highlighted basic principles which should be guiding 
the study and practice of security in every part of the world. These principles 
contribute the establishment of a ‘culture of security’ based on universal human 
rights.*^ ®
Third World was not the exclusive focus of critical security scholars. Rather, 
they applied their conceptual insights to different parts of the world, including 
various Third World regions. These case studies, together with pieces of work that 
reviewed the writings of Third World secmity scholars, argued that the security of 
individuals are ultimately more important than the security of states, therefore issues 
that have life-and-death relevance for the majority of people living in the world 
should be included in the security agenda. What it implies for the Third World, is
Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f  Security,” 210-211. 
Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy, and Critical Theory. 116.
535 1’ Booth, “A Security Regime,” 1.
that “the need for strengthening existing state mechanisms in the Third World should
not be made an excuse for marginalizing individuals’ and social groups’ needs.” In
other words, reasons for state-making cannot be used as a pretext for limiting the
exercise of democratic freedoms and violating basic human rights.
Critics also underlined the point that “states should be treated as means, but
not the only means.”^^ * Their studies directed attention to the agency of non-state
actors and pointed to the potential of alternative political communities (local,
regional, transnational) in delivering different aspects of security. They put special
emphasis on the role of academics and intellectuals in informing and guiding human
agency. Building upon the rich tradition of critical theory on the relationship between
theory and practice, and inspired by the writings of Edward Said, scholars of critical
security define their purpose as emancipating ‘the poor, the disadvantaged, the
voiceless, the unrepresented, the p o w e r le s s ,a n d  set their task as
placing the experience of those men and women and communities for 
whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than 
security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity 
rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are 
viewed.^ '*®
This orientation has significant implications for the study and practice of seciuity in 
the Third World. It has a special importance nowadays, after the September 11 
attacks, which are regarded as the events that have shifted the course of international 
relations fi*om a ‘peaceful’ age of globalization to a global ‘War on Terror.’^ "^ ' Yet,
Ken Booth, “Nuclearism, Human Rights and Constructions o f  Security (Part 1),” The International 
Journal o f  Human Rights 3:2(1999) 1.
Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f  Security,” 210.
Bilgin, “Individual and Societal Dimensions o f  Security,” 216.
For the original work o f Said, see Edward Said, Representations o f  the Intellectual (London; 
Vintage, 1994) 84.
^  Wyn Jones, Security. Strategy and Critical Theory. 159.
Douglas Kellner, “Theorizing September 11: Social Theory, History and Globalization,” available 
at www.gseis.ucla.edu/facultv/kellner/papers/theorizing911 .htm. According to Amitav Acharya, by 
creating a growing sense o f  insecurity within America, September 11 “blurrs the once fashionable 
distinction between Western and Third World security approaches, in which the latter focused on their
the Third World experience clearly shows that this ‘peace’, if it has ever prevailed, 
involved only restricted dimensions of global life and has left largely xmtouched vast 
peripheral stretches of the globe.^^  ^ The contrast between the “fully-reported horror 
of 9/11 in the United States and the generally unreported daily horror faced by the 
world’s poor” becomes more evident when one recognizes that “those killed in New 
York, Pennysylvania on 9/11 added up to less than half the number of children who 
die somewhere in the world each day from diarrhoea, as a result of the lack of clean 
water.” '^^  ^As Ken Booth puts it.
Nobody should forget what happened in and to the United States on 
September 11, 2001. As it happens, there is no fear of that, because it 
will be kept alive by the world’s most powerful media. Equally, 
nobody should ignore what happens in and to the world’s oppressed 
people(s) between January 1 and December 31 every year. We may 
well because this is the suffering of the largely silenced majority.
As he points out, the largely silenced majority suffers because of the political and
economic choices made by governments— t^heir own and others. These children do
not die from natural causes; they are ‘made to die’ by international politics. They are
not victims of diarrhoea, but victims of poverty. This extreme human insecurity—
manifested in the deaths of thousands every day from preventable diseases—is a
direct consequence of the way human society is politically organized on a global
scale. ‘Third World’ insecurity is neither a geographical phenomenon, nor a destiny.
It rests on political choices. So does the reduction of insecurity. '^*  ^ What is needed,
then, is theories diat “delineate and clarify the choices being faced in the practical
realm,” '^*® and “reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities.” '^*^
domestic front while the former pursued defence against foreign military aggression.” Smith and 
Acharya, “The Concept o f Security Before and After September 11,” 25-26.
Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order. 30.
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the Nation State, eds. Ersel Aydmli and J.N.Rosenau (New York: SUNY Press, forthcoming) 73.
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The integration of critical approaches into the study of security has opened 
new horizons in the field of Security Studies. Insights provided by scholars of critical 
security help us move beyond the spatial differentiation of the ‘Third World’ and 
claims for distinct modes of theorizing for this entity. Their conceptxial fi’amework 
removes the risk of essentializing differences by perceiving ‘Third World security 
problems’ as ‘global insecurities,’ and melting the question of ‘security in the Third 
World’ within the broader template of ‘global security.’ It also eliminates the risk of 
oversimplifying differences by dropping the ‘Third World’ as the central category of 
analysis and focusing on more specific areas instead. Their approach to security 
privileges historical particularity, but also adopts a global perspective. However, it is 
crucial for critical scholars to develop their studies more in the direction of case 
studies of particular regions through which they can “engage [more] with the real by 
suggesting policies, agents and sites of change, [and]...help human kind in whole and 
in part, to move away from its structural wrongs.” "^** If Security Studies is to help us 
meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, it seems only possible by students 
with area specializations, a sound knowledge of the theory and practice of human 
rights together with comparative politics, and a comprehensive understanding of 
environmental issues and problems of economic development.Even if the field 
cannot “sing a more secure world into existence,”^^ ° it can assist policies that aim at 
expanding human security, and become an important voice informing and 
legitimating those political practices that might bring about the development of a 
peaceful, secure and a just order.
Andrew Linklater, Bevond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1990) 172.
Booth, “Security and Self,” 114.
Booth, “Security and Emancipation,” 324; Booth, “Security and Self,” 113-114.
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